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Professor Ihekwoaba Declan Onwudiwe, Advisor
Nigeria has recently witnessed the repeated prevalence of a fog of terror that has
threatened the stability, peace, and sovereignty of the nation. While the world's attention
focuses on Afghanistan, Iraq, and bombings in embassies around the Western world,
shocking terrorist activities with immeasurably devastating impacts are regularly ignored
by the Nigerian government and the international community. Since 1970, Nigeria has
continued to experience repeated domestic attacks entrenched in different forms of
tensions and motivations. The Global Terrorism Index (2019) ranked Nigeria as the third
most terrorized country in the world, behind only Iraq and Afghanistan with 1,634
attacks, 16,108 dead, 7,575 injured, and 2,828 held in captivity from 2013 to 2017. The
Nigerian state has become an unfortunate theater of insecurity, bloodshed, and a
genocidal arena caused by the bloodshed by Boko Haram and Fulani herdsmen.
The objective of this dissertation is to illustrate and underscore the apparent
method in the designation of a violent group as a terrorist group, and explain how some
groups are labeled as terrorists, while some organizations that deserved to be designated
as terrorist groups are not. This researcher analyzed mainly data from the Global
terrorism Database and other scholarly literature, using qualitative approaches with
1
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descriptive analysis. This dissertation should help inform policymakers about terrorism
and counterterrorism policies, initiate policies that will curb terrorists’ activities in
Nigeria, and provide knowledge for future research. Criminological theories such as
labeling, anomie/strain, deterrence were applied to examine the menacing activities of
terrorism in Nigeria.
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CHAPTER 1
INTRODUCTION
Nigeria is a West African country in the Gulf of Guinea with a total area of
923,770 km and a coastline of 853 km (National Bureau of Statistics 2017). Nigeria has
national borders with the four neighboring countries of Benin, Cameroon, Chad, and
Niger. These directly adjacent areas have equally direct connections for the infiltration of
militant groups (UN Population Division, 2011). The nation has experienced several
militant groups or terrorist organizations. The modus operandi of these organizations
suggests what led to their formation. Crenshaw (2010) noted that terrorism is a common
tactic that uses violence or the threat of it as a coercive approach to cause political
intimidation and fear. The Nigerian political arena has been bedeviled by this cancer of
terrorism. Terrorism generally may be related to indiscriminate violence. In a different
setting, terrorism could be perceived in terms of revolution, freedom fighting, and
rebellion (Enders & Sandler, 2006).
Though several articles and presentations about terrorism exist, little study has
been done in terms of conspiracy and dereliction of duty by those entrusted with the
responsibility of protecting lives. This dissertation will be a further contribution to
addressing this issue but from a novel perspective of the conspiracy involved in the
designation of a group as terrorists. The proscription and subsequent designation of IPOB
as a terrorist group on September 20, 2017 by the federal government of Nigeria calls for
further scrutiny. According to Muhammed (2017), Boko Haram on its part, armed with
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terror and buoyed by government inaction, seized large swaths of land. The inertia in
Abuja lubricated the group’s advance. Moreover, (Eze, 2018) posited, “The world leaders
should stop playing ostrich in the light of these revelations at the detriment of the
people.” One person killed in the United States, France, or Britain will receive about a
week of coverage and scrutiny by news media like CNN and FOX news, whereas 60
people killed in Southern Kaduna on the eve of the Nigerian presidential election 2018
hardly received a mention by these networks (SBS News, 2019). The conspiracy of
silence even by the civilized world is very loud. Eze further stated that the refusal of
Western powers to sell arms to the government of Nigeria is quite curious despite their
excuses. While others with clear and legitimate cases of agitation are treated as a terrorist
group, Boko Haram’s terrorism ideology and dispositions are treated with kid gloves.
Groups like Boko Haram and the daredevil Fulani herdsmen have continued unchecked
to unleash sorrow, pain, and death on different Nigerian communities.
According to the International Crisis Group (2015), violent conflicts between the
Fulani herdsmen and farmers from the southern and central areas have intensified and are
spreading to other parts of the country. This also is threatening the sovereignty and peace
of Nigeria. The International Crisis Group further asserted that the Fulani herdsmen
attacks on citizens are becoming as dangerous as the Boko Haram insurgency. Yet, to
date, the response from the government has been very discouraging. Amnesty
International (2016) accused the Nigerian Army of murdering over 150 members of an
unarmed agitating group, the IPOB, at the small town of Nkpor in Anambra state. This
recorded incidence by Amnesty International took place during the celebration of their
IPOB independence. While the government is busy fighting other agitating groups, Boko
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Haram and Fulani herdsmen are busy destroying innocent and defenseless Nigerians and
their farms. Omede and Omede (2004) stated “people are burdened daily with
psychological and emotional trauma resulting from gory sights of lifeless and mutilated
bodies of loved family members, close associates, and colleagues littered on the streets,
public squares, and everywhere” (p. 2).
The silence by the government and the conspiratorial decision not to act in the
face of obvious mayhem meted to Nigerians are reasons for this study. In an onslaught by
the Fulani herdsmen at the Uzo-Uwani local government area of Enugu state, 40 people
were left dead (Abiodun, 2016). According to the Global Terrorism Database (2015),
terrorist activity in Nigeria is dominated by two groups: Fulani Extremist and Boko
Haram militants. Global Terrorism Index ranked Nigeria as the third most terrorized
country in the world only behind Iraq and Afghanistan, with 1,634 attacks, 16,108 dead,
7,575 injured, and 2,828 held in captivity from 2013 to 2017. The contemporary Nigerian
state has become an unfortunate theatre of insecurity, bloodshed, and genocidal arena
caused by the bloody activities of Boko Haram and Fulani herdsmen. Despite the
occasional military actions against these groups, their onslaught against the people has
remained unabated. Conversely, the military might and actions by Operation Python
Dance, a military action group formed for the total eradication of the separatist group
known as IPOB, seemed to be more decisive than the actions meted against the
internationally known Islamic jihadist groups of Boko Haram and Fulani herdsmen.
Amnesty International (2016) stated that the Nigerian government’s decision to send in
the military to respond to IPOB events seems to be in large part to blame for the
excessive bloodshed. In that operation, over 150 members of IPOB group were killed.
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There are other agitating groups like the Niger Delta Avengers (NDA) that target
government structures and protest for the attention of the authorities regarding the
degradation of their environment. Groups like IPOB and OPC are neither imposing any
religious ideology nor seeking any imperialistic ambition based on religious antecedents
but is fighting for their God-given economic opportunities without shedding blood.
(Oyeniyi, 2010) however, stated that, the attempt by the Nigerian government to use a
terrorist label against these groups may have also created some confusion.
The emergence of the Boko Haram and Fulani herdsmen changed the calculus of
agitation from regional socio-economic opportunities to the total Islamization of Nigeria
through terror. BBC (2016) submitted that Nigeria’s terrorist group Boko Haram has
caused mayhem in Africa’s most populated country through a wave of bombings,
assassination, abductions, and fighting to overthrow the government and create an
Islamic state. Their modes of operation and ideology were not based on any stipulated
legitimate factor but rather on changing the social and religious norms and the
configuration of Nigeria without recourse to her circular statehood. The group planned to
achieve this unsecular socio-religious order through a complete act of Islamization of the
country, making Sharia law a central and supreme part of the criminal justice system
(Chilaka & Idika, 2019). Chilaka and Idika further posited that Boko Haram and Fulani
herdsmen are radically different from other militant groups that came before and after
them: Niger Delta Avengers (NDA), Odua People’s Congress (OPC), Movement for the
Actualization of Sovereign State of Biafra (MASOB), the Movement for the
Emancipation of Niger Delta (MEND), and Indigenous People of Biafra (IPOB). These
groups are fundamentally different from Boko Haram and Fulani herdsmen, considering
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that what Boko Haram is doing cold be tantamount to treason and a declaration of war
against the Nigerian state based on the Universal Declaration of Human Rights Standards
1948.
The Boko Haram group has been globally known, proscribed, and designated as a
Nigeria-based terrorist organization by the U.S. Department of State (2013). Boko
Haram, according to the Global Terrorism Index (2015), has been second-deadliest terror
group on earth; yet the Nigerian government could not proscribe or designate it
accordingly. Boko Haram and Fulani herdsmen have been responsible for more than
7,000 deaths, according to the Global Terrorism Index (2013). Their activities speak
louder with corresponding terror and bloodletting that constantly follow in their wake.
Few other militant groups in Nigeria have applied some level of violence in the past. The
OPC, NDA, and IPOB are recognized members of society pursuing legitimate social and
sectional political interests, but the faceless Boko Haram sect is executing an ideological
war to Islamize the secular state of Nigeria. Thurston (2016) stated that “Boko Haram
represents an ugly paradox, and its ideas have limited appeal but significant staying
power.” Their staying power stems from support by some unscrupulous politicians,
wealthy religious bigots, and other terror groups who believe in the ideology of the group
and support them with arms and finance. Independent Newspaper (2014) reported the
spokesman of Boko Haram in 2014 as saying, “Al-Qaida are our elder brothers; we enjoy
financial and technical support from them. Anything we want from them we ask them.”
The unfortunate and gory incidents reported by (Mamah et al., 2016) in some
parts of Nigeria, notably Enugu State, Benue State, Plateau State, and Ondo State where
the invading Fulani herdsmen have murdered, raped, and destroyed farm products of their
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victims, lend credence to the view that terrorism in Nigeria has assumed a conspiratorial
dimension. Lack of responsive action on the part of the same government that proscribed
IPOB suggests that Nigerians and victims of these unabated herdsmen’s attacks have
surrendered to the vicissitudes of threats of nomadic terror. Scores of Nigerians have
been sent to early graves in their own homes by these unhinged herdsmen.
Notwithstanding, the impunity and complacency that accompanied such bloodbath, the
government has not probed adequately the prevailing air of helplessness by those whose
lives and properties were supposed to be protected. Allen (2017) reported that the
government of Buhari declared temporary victory over the Boko Haram, having believed
that they have pushed them out of their enclave in the Sambisa forest. Allen further stated
that despite president Buhari’s proclamation, Boko Haram is not defeated. Cummings
(2018) said, “The Nigerian government has claimed victory against the group half a
dozen times before only to see it re-form and adapt.” The truth is that the present
government has done nothing to stop or tame the Fulani-herdsmen menace. The notion
that many see it as a systemic plan by the Fulani’s to further Islamize Nigeria through
encroachment, intimidation, and domination still must be addressed and adequately
refuted. No organized group armed with AK-47 on such a murderous rampage should be
allowed to thrive or be given special treatment.
Comparatively, Mazi Nnamdi Kanu, the leader of IPOB and the pro-Biafra from
eastern Nigeria did come close to the barbaric and murderous actions of what the Miyetti
Allah, also known as Fulani herdsmen, had done. Yet IPOB was expeditiously handled
with a military precision and war-like manner of the Operation Python Dance and labeled
a terrorist group by the Buhari-led federal government in September 2017.
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There are problems with the current designation of a violent group as a terrorist
group and who has the authority to designate such. While some organizations are rightly
designated, it is unfortunate that some that deserved to be so designated are left out, while
other legitimate and nonviolent groups have been erroneously designated as terrorists for
political expediency. Terrorist groups are by their nature politically influenced and
motivated. These criminals operate in diverse ways. Some are persuaded by ideological
instigation (Omotosho, 2003), while others are just criminal-minded opportunists who
lack respect for sacred things and other religions (Salawu, 2010). However, what
separates terrorist from common criminals who specialize in gangsterism, like the mafia,
a crime syndicate, or mob action, is the ideological difference.
Several studies have shown that the Boko Haram insurgency in Nigeria was a
function of crude political activities of the elites (Nmezi, 2015). The rough Nigerian type
of politics that largely emphasizes religious ideology as a hidden tool for the pursuit of
sectional political aggrandizement has helped in the formation of the Boko Haram. Such
pursuit is embedded in the historical south/north racial identity fractionalization. This
fractionalization emphasizes the institutionalized political divisions that have continued
to fan the ember of racism to the delight of the regional political elites. The conspiracy
involved in the prescription and nonprescription of some of the terror groups in Nigeria
has emboldened some of the terror groups to continue in their orgy of killing. Economic
poverty and inequality caused by corrupt politicians have resulted in grievances in some
parts of the country, especially the south (Omede, 2012). This has created rooms for
adaptation by the deprived youths.
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Statement of the Problem
The conspiracy theory of terrorism is one of several theories that attempt to
describe terrorism. The literature relating to conspiracy theory is patchy and opinionated;
and conspiracy theories are commonly defined as explanatory beliefs about a group of
actors that collude in secret to reach malevolent goals (Bale, 2007). This could cause
problems in understanding the positions of those who attest to a conspiracy theory. This
research consolidates much of the literature and relates the force of conspiracy theory
ideology to the political decision-making process.
Terrorism is a major threat to universal peace and stability in contemporary times
(Adejumo, 2011). Terrorism has seemed to have an upsurge in recent years.
Undoubtedly, the global indicator of terrorism has been repeatedly evident in Nigeria.
The phenomenon has found a glaring expression with the emergence of the Boko Haram
insurgency. Adejumo stated that the emergence of the Boko Haram sectional insurrection
has wreaked massive havoc in Nigeria state; “using explosives and firearms with
gruesome, fatal consequences.” Despite that, the government in Nigeria has continued to
shy away from prescribing and designating groups like Boko Haram and Fulani herdsmen
as terrorist. Yet training, preparation, resources, and the effects of their nefarious
activities have continued to affect Nigerians and other nationals (Oyeniyi, 2010).
The history of terrorism in Nigeria can be traced to the advent of the Islamic
militia group named Boko Haram in 2002. Since then, other militant groups have arisen,
some as a result of legitimate struggles for the emancipation of their region from
economic deprivation and strangulation. Others arose as a result of political
marginalization and subjugation of their region in the national scheme of things. Since
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the emergence of Boko Haram in 2002 and the recent unleashing of Fulani herdsmen,
human lives have been lost and lowered to below the value of a cow. Ludovica (2015)
observed that though Boko Haram was prominent in the news headlines, attention was
not particularly focused on the kidnapping and attacks by the Fulani herdsmen. Previous
studies have examined the impact of terrorism in Nigeria from various standpoints, such
as the political, educational, regional, and national. I will analyze terrorism in Nigeria by
examining the above factors for holistic perspectives, especially the conspiracy of
terrorism as it affects the socio-economic environment of Nigeria, the third-most
terrorized nation according to the GTI.
Purpose of the Study
The major purpose of this dissertation is to examine the conspiracy and the impact
of terrorism on the political, economic, and educational institutions in Nigeria. In this
dissertation, the investigator explored and explained how some groups are labeled as
terrorist groups, while other organizations that deserved to be designated as terrorist
groups are not. To clearly and coherently identify the conspiracy of terrorism in Nigerian
political space, it is important to examine the activities of all the militants and ethnic
agitators that led to their agitation, their ideology, mode of agitation, and the level of pain
and damages inflicted on the society by analyzing data from the Global Terrorism
Database and other literature. Qualitative approaches with descriptive analysis will be
applied to help inform policymakers about terrorism and counterterrorism policies and to
provide knowledge for future research. Also, the study scrutinized the political influence
on terrorism and, carefully ascertains what the government has done to protect people and
property. Moreover, light would be shined on how the Nigerian government identifies
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and labels any group as terrorist organization - Pursuing parochial, religious, and personal
political interest, while hiding under the cloak of national interest to crush the identified
enemy of the people and state has been the bane on the fight for terrorism in Nigeria.
Significance of the Study
The study of the conspiracy theory of terrorism is significant because it offers a
basis for assessing present, past, and future efforts to combat terrorism. The study will
also provide potential opportunity for the policy making efforts to combat terrorism.
The researcher intends to raise awareness about the repeated incidents of
terrorism and the conspiracy of silence that has become the bane of Nigerian government.
The spate of violence arising from the nefarious activities of Boko Haram and the Fulani
herdsmen should be of immense concern not only to the Nigerian government but also
the international community. The complicit silence of the world over Nigeria’s terrorism
is a serious conspiracy. Greater conspiracy is evident in the Nigerian government’s
inability to boldly proscribe or designate the Boko Haram group or the Fulani herdsmen
as terrorist groups.
Moreover, study proffers vital insights into the ongoing discourse on Boko Haram
and Fulani herdsmen terrorism and the political conspiracy that has delayed the
proscription and designation of the groups as terrorist’s organization given their
clandestine, heinous activities. Recent research on this subject matter has failed to
adequately address the conspiracy and the impacts of this sectional phenomenon with
national security implications. However, in this study, criminological theories were
applied to further explain the impact of terrorism, the damage it causes, and the obvious
political conspiracy by the government.
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Designation Process
What seemingly constitutes terrorism is ambiguous and frequently debated.
Academic strategies for explaining and defining the notion of terrorism have therefore
involved charting consensus among researchers (Schmid, 1984). The U.S. Department of
State usually publishes lists of foreign terrorist organizations (FTO), which is the
designation for non-U.S.-centered terrorist organizations, pursuant to section 219 of the
Immigration and Nationality Act of 1965.
The moment a target is identified as culpable and terrorist-compliant, as in the
case of Boko Haram, the Office of the Coordinator for Counterterrorism in the U.S
prepares a comprehensive administrative record, which serves as a compilation of
information typically containing both classified and open sources of information,
signifying that the statutory benchmarks for the designation have been met (State.gov.,
2014). When the secretary of state, in consultation with the secretary of the treasury and
attorney general, decides to make the designation, the U. S. Congress is informed of the
secretary’s intent to designate the organization as a terrorist and is given seven days to
evaluate the designation, as the Immigration and National Act requires. After the 7-day
waiting period has passed and a notice of the designation is published in the Federal
Register, the designation takes effect. An organization designated as an FTO may seek
judicial review of the designation in the U. S. Court of Appeals no later than 30 days after
the designation is published in the Federal Register. Furthermore, under the Intelligence
Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of (2004), the FTO may file a petition for
revocation 2 years after the designation date (Giorgetti, 2006).
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The FTO and Executive Order 13224 designations comprise a proscription against
any entity or groups that knowingly attempt to provide or collaborate to provide
resources, mental support, or engage in transactions with Boko Haram and the equally
repulsive Ansaru. They can lead to the freezing of all U.S. property and interests in the
designated organizations. The Department of State took these actions in strict
consultation with the Departments of Justice and the Treasury. While the searchlight of
the Department of State has been turned on Boko Haram, having satisfied the
requirements for the designation as a terrorist group, the IPOB have not pursued a violent
agitation that could have warranted being designated a terrorist organization. However,
the government of Nigeria under the controversial leadership of a strong member of
Miyetti Allah (Fulani herdsman) rushed to designate them as a terrorist group.
Research Questions
1. What is the prevalence of terrorism in Nigeria?
2. What impact does terrorism have on political, economic, educational, and
social institutions in Nigeria?
3. What is the designation process of terrorism?
4. How can researchers successfully address the problem of terrorism and related
conspiracy in Nigeria?
Defining Terrorism
Terrorism is a multifaceted global phenomenon widely studied in the literature
(Schmid, 1998). Terrorism has become an unfortunate major part of our civilization.
Researchers have shown that human civilization has been replete with terrorist behavior
regardless of sophistication (Laqueir, 2000). Global Terrorism Index (2019), defines
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terrorism as the unlawful use of violence and intimidation, especially against civilians, in
pursuit of political aims. It further stated that defining terrorism is not straightforward;
and there is no distinct universally accepted definition of what constitutes terrorism. GTI
also stated this is in consideration that there is no binding definition of terrorism. There
are quite diverse explanations; for some, the term is closely linked to nonstate violence
against private citizens. White (2006) posited that governments, represented by
presidents, kings, czars, tyrants, and some religious leaders, have historically rationalized
the use of terror to legitimize their sovereign domain or ordained power. Occasionally,
the explanations or definitions point to purely religious backgrounds or affiliations.
Omede and Omede (2004) described terrorism as a strategy and a tactic, a crime, a holy
responsibility, a justified reaction aimed at oppression, and an inexcusable abomination.
It is the use of violent action to achieve and is aimed at achieving political goals or to
force a government to act (Hornby, 2000).
The history of terrorism in modern Nigeria is traceable to the emergence of a
group of Islamic militants named Boko Haram (Vanguard, 2014). Ruby (2002) defines
“terrorism” as a violent act intended to create fear for political achievement, religious, or
ideological goals. In evaluating the above position, the action must have a political,
religious, economic, or social goal. In most cases, the actions do not serve the pure profit
of the perpetrators. The actions of the perpetrators are directed mainly at a deeper change
in politics, religion, and society. The perpetrators’ actions may not be rightly considered
as acts of war, based on the Geneva Conventions of 1949. Roser (2013) said, “Terrorism
is usually understood as the use or threat of violence to further a political cause.”
Terrorism is an anxiety-inspiring method of repeated violent action employed by semi-
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clandestine individuals, groups, or state actors for idiosyncratic, criminal, or political
reasons (Barga, 2012). Notwithstanding the idiosyncratic or criminal motivation of
terrorism, terrorism is essentially political (Hoffman, 1998). Hoffman stated that
terrorism in its most contemporary understanding is inherently political. It is the political
essence and characterization of terrorism that distinguishes it from other forms of
violence (Barga, 2012).The United States Department of Defense (2000) defines
terrorism as a “calculated use of unlawful violence to inculcate fear, intended to coerce or
to intimidate government or societies in the pursuit of goals that are generally political,
religious, or ideological.” This identifies three elements that are critical in terrorism: fear,
violence, and intimidation. In 1974, the British government defined “terrorism” as “the
use of violence for political ends and includes any use of violence for purpose of putting
the public, or any section of the public in fear.” The Federal Bureau of Investigation
(2002) used this definition to explain terrorism as “the unlawful use of force and violence
against persons or property to intimidate or coerce a government, the civilian population,
or any segment thereof, in furtherance of political or social objectives.”
Crenshaw (2009) said that terrorism could be separated from other forms of
violence in the following ways:
•

If it is primarily used, though not solely, to influence the political behavior of
any government, society, or particular social group.

•

If it is directed against a wider spread target than the immediate victims.

•

If it is designed and pre-planned to create an environment of extreme fear; and

•

If it is considered abnormal in the society where it occurs, and it violates the
rules regulating dissent, protest, and disputes.
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Wilkerson (1993) further suggested that there are various typologies of terrorist groups or
movements in society. The ethno-nationalistic groups of agitators are identified by their
persistent vitality of ethnocentrism, tribal, and sectional motivation. In Nigeria, these
groups include but are not limited to the Odua People’s Congress. The NDA and IPOB
are sectional groups who are more inclined to pursue the interest of their tribes and
regions. Terrorism is basically sectarian in operation. Nchi (2013) stated that it is mostly
related to the activities of a peripheral and ideologically ill-informed subgroup of a
broader political or religious affiliation. Similarly, Shabayany (2012) stated that it is a
zealous war waged by a puritan few against the enormous army of innocent people of
different religious class and gender.
The second group type identified by Wilkerson (1993) includes the ideological
and religious groups. These are terrorists whose goals are embedded in the ideology of
creating a nation-state based on their fanaticism and ideological belief. The Boko Haram
and Fulani herdsmen belong to this group. Their ideology is based on creating a state
where Sharia will be the supreme model of the criminal justice system, and non-adherents
would be treated as unbelievers who do not deserve to live. Barga (2012) argued that
terrorism is inexorably about power, the acquisition of it, and the use of it to bring change
at all costs. Eze (2019, p. 6) cited the U. S. Department of Defense’s definition of
terrorism as “the unlawful use of force (coercion) or violence against individuals or
property to coerce and intimidate government to accept political, religious or ideological
objectives.”
The concept of terrorism in Nigerian society’s discourse has been variously used,
especially to denote methods of illegitimate and unconventional violence targeted by a
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dangerous group at the society, state, or any part of the population thereof. Sani (2012)
observed that terrorism is the carrying out of unjust aggression by individuals against
human beings. It includes types of harming, unjustly terrifying, threatening, and the
killing of people and unimaginable banditry. Rodin (2004) stated that “terrorism is the
deliberate, negligent and reckless use of force against noncombatants, by state or nonstate
actors for ideological ends and in the absence of a substantively just legal process.”
According to Okoli (2014), terrorism thrives on what could be described as “hitand-run combatancy.” This can be viewed through the lenses of imaginable and surprised
hostility, vicious insurgency, and overt or covert brutality. The strategies adopted by
terrorists around the world and in Nigeria are very similar. Perhaps these means of
executing their diabolic mayhem would help any student of terrorism to make an
informed decision on how to identify a terrorist group. According to (p. 40) these lists
would be a guide:
•

Arson (homes, churches, government properties)

•

Mass killing (in churches, mosques, parks, homes)

•

Suicide bombings (embassies, plane, churches, mosques, parks)

•

High-jacking planes

•

Piracy

•

Kidnapping

•

Propaganda through the media

•

Forced enlistment and recruitment of combatants.

To highlight the crux of the conception of terrorism and its conspiracy in this
research, it suffices to note here that terrorism revels in the unlawful use or
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threatened use of force or violence by a person at an instance of a group agenda or
organized group against people or property with the intention of intimidating or
coercing societies or governments, often for ideological or political reasons
(Adejumo, 2011).
This definition is germane and credible and best suits the purpose and significance
of this dissertation. The terrorist attacks on Nigerian society have been rising
astronomically, and the profile of the country has degenerated because of the incidences.
The attacks by Boko Haram and Fulani herdsmen have continued to go unchecked, and
the government has never designated the group as terrorist. Meanwhile, the only group
designated as a terrorist group by the Nigerian government of President Muhammadu
Buhari is the IPOB, a nonviolent group agitating for a referendum to become a sovereign
state. Hoffman (1998) stated that “terrorism is a pejorative and abusive word used by
political leaders against perceived opponents of the state.” The Global Terrorism Index
(2015) recorded that Nigeria is the third most terrorized nation in the world due to the
activities of Boko Haram. Salkida (2012) noted that Boko Haram attacks have claimed
about 1,500 lives as of 2011. Despite the obvious activities of the Boko Haram and their
association with the Al-Qaida, the Nigerian government has continued to shield them
from proscription and designation as a terrorist group.

CHAPTER 2
LITERATURE REVIEW
“Yet the most terrible of terrorism is man in his delusion”—Schiller (2002)
Boko Haram and Terrorism Perception
Boko Haram was officially designated as a Nigerian terrorist organization by the
U.S. Department of State on November 13, 2013. According to Nicholas (2014), the
United Nations’ listing entry described the group as an affiliate of the AI Qaeda and a
major part of Al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM). The Nigerian government has
not yet seen the need to proscribe or designate this group as a terrorist group despite its
being one of the most dreaded terrorist groups in the world. The radicalization began in
2002 in Bornu state, Nigeria by Islamist jihadist Mohammed Yusuf. According to
Johnson (2011), Mohammed was an Islamic jihadist cleric and fundamentalist. He, a
Salafist, was of the school of thought often related to jihad.
Mohammed had an extreme and radical interpretation of the Koran, under the
tutelage and influence of Ibn Taymiyyah, an Islamic scholar and preacher of Islamic
fundamentalism. Farouk (2012) stated that in a radical move to Islamize the Nigerian
society, Yusuf set up a mosque in 2002 in Maiduguri, Bornu State and recruited willing
militants from the neighboring countries of Cameroon, Chad, and Niger. Johnson (2011)
stated that the Boko Haram rebellion and terrorism rose to its peak in July 2009 when
security forces started a campaign to suppress their aggression against the Nigerian
government. The group was undeterred given that they are pursuing the motive of
Islamizing Nigeria, which dates back to the time of the Jihad of Usman Dan Fodio
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(Adetoro, 1982). According to Suleiman (2011), Boko Haram’s primary objectives were
to institute Sharia law and abolish democracy as they believed they were fighting for
justice. To echo their intention of forcefully establishing an Islamic caliphate and
imposing Sharia, Usigbe (2012) stated that the former democratically elected president,
Goodluck Jonathan, was threatened by the terrorist group to embrace Islamic religion or
relinquish his power as the president.
Boko Haram has been conducting a continuous and brutal campaign of pain and
sorrow against the military, civilian targets, and the government. Among their targets and
lethal attacks, the terrorist group carried out indiscriminate attacks in Benisheikh,
Nigeria, in September of 2013, which killed more than 160 unarmed citizens including
children and women (U.S. Department of State, 2014). The dangerous group has
conducted several attacks that include international soft-spot targets, such as the suicide
bombing of the UN building in Abuja on August 26, 2011, which killed 21 people and
injured dozens of aid workers supporting development projects around Nigeria (Boerma,
2014).
Nossiter (2012) noted the position of the United Nations in their report. The
United Nations was quoted to have linked Boko Haram with Al Qaeda Islamic
Movement (AQIM) in the Maghreb region. Meetings of the two groups and training were
reported to have been held in the summer of 2011 in the AI Qaeda training camp in Mali.
According to Jackson (2014, p. 11), Osama bin Laden sent his emissary to Nigeria to
share $3 to sympathetic Salafi groups. Among the recipients was the founder of Boko
Haram, Mohammed Yusuf. More so, documents discovered in the Abbottabad house in
2011 operation by American forces, show Boko Haram’s leaders had severally been in
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contact with high levels of al-Qaeda leadership, including bin Laden himself. Since 2009,
Boko Haram has continued to wage attritional and ceaseless wars against the Nigerian
government, the police, military targets, and UN Headquarters. Olawale and Adisa
(2012) observed that Boko Haram used explosives that were imported, self-made and
imported guns, and sophisticated ammunitions. The group was also reported to have
repeatedly stolen vehicles for suicide bombings.
Adenrele (2012) reported the heinous and clandestine activities of Boko Haram in
2009. Adenrele recorded that apart from taking arms against the Nigerian state, the group
caused the death of 800 people in 2009: 80 worshipers with a bomb in 2010, 5 people and
many injured in police headquarters in 2011, 20 people bombed to death in the United
Nations Headquarters in Abuja in 2011, 37 people in a church in Abuja. In 2012, Boko
Haram burnt 186 people to death in the Abuja Police Headquarters. In 2012, Boko Haram
criminally released 119 prisoners which include some of their militias, while killing one
warder in the process. Furthermore, 36 people were killed by Boko Haram with a stolen
car loaded with bombs in a church in Kaduna in 2012. Also, in 2012, 15 people were
killed with bombs and sporadic shootings by Boko Haram at a worship center in Kano.
Two foreigners were killed by the group in 2012 during a failed rescue mission by the
British (Thomson, 2012). In spite of all these wars against the Nigerian government and
her citizens, the federal government has adamantly refused to proscribe or designate this
dangerous group or the Fulani herdsmen as a terrorist group.
However, the desperate move by the same government to quickly proscribe and
designate the IPOB as a terrorist group stinks of conspiracy. Adejumo (2011) observed
that insecurity and terrorism have geographically spread across the entire globe.
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Adejumo, however, submitted that the difference between Nigeria and other nations is
how they manage the threats. Also, the conspiracy of silence by the Western powers over
the ceaseless killings and seeming annihilation of some sections of Nigeria is another
unexplained conspiracy. Chijioke and Innocent (2012) observed that from July 27, 2009
to February 17, 2012, Boko Haram had carried out 53 deadly attacks. Vanguard
newspapers put the death the toll at 12,000. While any terror attack on France, Britain, or
America would be given continuous cable network prime time publicity, the death of 20
Nigerians at the hands of Boko Haram or the killer Fulani herdsmen would only receive
few minutes’ mention, if it got a mentioned at all.
Plouch (2014) posited that the violent activities of Boko Haram came to the fore
when the police shot and killed over 800 of their members for carrying out violent
protests the state in pursuit of an Islamic agenda and ideology. According to the human
rights watch, Yusuf, other sect members, and his father-in-law were arrested and shot
afterward. An Islamist insurrection then ensued. The group started suicide bombings,
prison breaks, and several assassinations from Bornu, Yobe, Adamawa, and Abuja. Even
though the group started as a locally focused organization, claiming to represent the
disadvantaged populace of Nigeria, chiefly the people of the Northern region struggled
for regional political domination. Plouch (2014) observed that the members of Boko
Haram caused a lot of harms and unpleasant moments to the people by continuing
burning and destroying the communities using armaments and arson.
Boko Haram began to attract serious international attention and scrutiny in
August 2010 immediately after a suicide car bomb killed 18 people at the UN
headquarters in Abuja, the capital of Nigeria. Boko Haram claimed responsibility for the
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attack. The group’s attacks continued unabated until 2013 when the influence of al-Qaeda
in the Islamic Maghreb became obvious. Terrorism against unarmed civilians increased
in bounds and leaps as 65 students were killed while asleep at the college of agriculture in
Yobe in September 2013. Chain saws were used to behead truck drivers plying the route
under their domain. In the same year, the group continued to kill and maim civilians. In
2014 the attacks escalated with the bombing of a bus station that left many dead. In 2015,
270 schoolgirls were kidnapped by the vicious and faceless group, who refused to
negotiate with the government unless one condition was met: to Islamize Nigeria. The
unmitigated attacks against the state forced the Nigerian government to postpone the
presidential election for 6 weeks.
Niger Delta Avengers (NDA)
The struggle of the militant NDA has been based on pursuing compensation and
consideration for the environmental degradation created through the many years of oil
exploration and the exploitation of their land. Ikelegbe (2005) observed that,
notwithstanding the abundant natural resources in the region, its communities are greatly
in need of socio-economic gratification. The region desperately needs basic infrastructure
and social services. A major issue for the NDA is that the wealth of the country derived
from that region has been inadequately used in the development of the local communities.
Vanguard News (2018) posited that the region has become a “money-making machine”
for the whole country. The NDA is fighting against the government policies that have left
the region vulnerable to poverty, diverse diseases, and uncertainty. The marine activities
and agricultural life of the communities of the Niger Delta region have been totally
grounded with the pollution arising from spilled oil dug out from their land. The roads
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that could connect people are like death traps. Water and air have continued to suffer
degradation. The region obviously has continued to suffer untold neglect even though it
sustains the mono-economic base of the country. Niger Delta is an oil-rich region that is
the mainstay of the Nigerian economy. The dispute that brought about the NDA arose
from these issues and the case of controversial ownership of the oil located in the Niger
Delta region. These have brought conflict between the communities and the government.
This is quite different from the Boko Haram, which took up arms against the government,
and the Fulani herdsmen who transverse the length and breadth of Nigeria with the blood
of the slain trailing them. Adebayo (2014) observed that the founder of Boko Haram
Muhammed Yusuf established the group and included a mosque and a school where
many vulnerable families within and outside Nigeria could sign up, with the ulterior
motive of drafting them as future Jihadist to fight against the state. Yusuf was able to
recruit membership from various unemployed youths, whose condition has made them
become frustrated with the state.

The NDA has emerged as a regional militant group in the Niger Delta region. However,
Osaghae (2008) noted that the militants believe they are fighting for their seriously
deprived and neglected communities and unborn generations. Several strategies have
been employed by the federal government to quash the restiveness in the affected states
of the region. The NDA has continued to remain undeterred in the pursuit of a legitimate
distribution of the wealth derived from their land despite government efforts to silence
them. Ekine (2008) and Oshionebo (2009) reported that militancy comes with other vices
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and atrocities like rape, theft, kidnapping, and vandalizing private and government
properties.
Unlike the Boko Haram’s fundamentalist ideology embedded in their efforts to
Islamize Nigeria, NDA and their operation have been described with various terms. Ekine
(2008) stated that some movements have a legitimate cause for their agitation and could
also be termed ‘freedom fighters,’ given the degree of protest that surrounds their
agitation. These insurgent groups mostly arose with the intention of defending the
community and the inhabitants from political isolation, exploitation, poverty, and
displacement through eminent domain, Daly (2012), Forney (2015). Various scholars
have found out that insurgent groups form with the forceful conditions of the affected
people who believed that there are needs to not only safeguard their resources but also
their motherland(Collier, et al., 2004).
Indigenous People of Biafra (IPOB)
The International Crisis Group (2015) described IPOB as a separatist
organization. Thompson (2012) described IPOB as a faction of the movement for the
actualization of a sovereign state of Biafra (MASSOB). The BBC’s report (2015) rightly
stated that the members of the IPOB group are mainly ethnic Igbo’s who feel that they
have been unduly discriminated against by the successive governments in power.
Likewise, the International Crisis Group posited that the activities of IPOB are an attempt
to attract attention and spending from the federal government, based on the longstanding
and recent economic and political grievances.
After the unfortunate war between Nigeria and Biafra, there was a reasonable
expectation based on the declaration of the then-Head of State General Gowon that there
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was no victor or vanquished. Ugorji (2017) stated that the inefficient and failed
administration of the postwar transitional justice program caused the re-emergence of
Biafra and its agitation for separation. Ugorji further argued that there is a failure in
addressing the human rights abuses and genocidal crimes committed against the Biafra’s
during the war. Fifty years after the war, the painful memories of the war that killed over
1 million Igbos remain indelible. Moreover, the Igbo war survivors are still battling with
the trauma of the war. There has not been an Igbo president in Nigeria. Nigeria has been
ruled for 41 years and counting by Hausa-Fulani, and Yoruba from the southwest Igbos
still feel that they are being marginalized and punished because of the aborted session
caused by the systemic massacre of the Igbos living in the Northern part of the country at
the time.
The IPOB is asking for a stake in Nigeria or that they should be allowed to go for
self-determination because of years of socio-political and economic deprivation and
marginalization of their region. According to Ogoloma (2013),
Conflict is as a result of frustration when ‘legitimate desires’ of a person or group
has denied them either directly or indirectly as a result of the way the society is
structured. The feeling of disappointment may lead such a man or group to
express anger through violence that will be directed at those held responsible.
This anger and violence can also be directed to people who are directly or
indirectly related to those people that are said to be responsible for their
unacceptable fate (p.3).
The IPOB has continued to pursue its agitation without arms or ammunition. No
civilian has been killed in the pursuit of this self-determination project. They had no
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standing army and neither did they detonate bombs on innocent civilians. Amnesty
International (2016) documented that all IPOB gatherings were largely peaceful. When
there were pockets of violence, they were mainly caused by the reactions to shootings by
the military forces. Unlike the Boko Haram or the Miyetti Allah Cattle Breeders
Association, otherwise known as the Fulani herdsmen, who usually leave blood and
mayhem on their trails, the IPOB, led by Mazi Nnamdi Kanu, was eventually proscribed
and officially designated a “terrorist organization” by the government of President
Muhammadu Buhari, a Fulani man and leader of the Miyetti Cattle Breeders Association.
Hitherto, Nnamdi Kanu, and other pro-Biafra elements had never committed any act of
murder, arson, rape, violation of people’s space, or dispossession of properties or land
from the rightful owners. Instead, pro-Biafra have continued to wage a bloodless
campaign for a referendum and self-determination. The IPOB campaign is covered under
UN resolution 2625 (xxv) which states:
By virtue of the principle of equal rights and self-determination of principles
enshrined in the charter of the United Nations, all peoples have the right freely to
determine, without external interference, their political status and to pursue their
economic, social and cultural development, and every state has the duty to respect
this right in accordance with the provisions of the charter (p.10).
Despite the nonviolent approach of the pro-Biafra agitators, the government of
Muhammed Buhari deemed it fit to proscribe their activities in total disregard of the
viewpoint of the international community.
IPOB is only agitating for an autonomous Biafra state (Amnesty International
2016; Campbell, 2018). A statement by Amnesty International on the repression of pro-
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Biafra activists shows IPOB was formed in 2012, while other sources state that IPOB was
formed in 2014 (BBC, 2017; Turnbull, 2017). These sources further stated that an attempt
to proclaim an autonomous state of Biafra in 1967 resulted in a civil war, causing in
nearly 1 million dead and several thousand wounded. The secessionist Biafra’s mainly
from the southeastern part of Nigeria were defeated in the civil war; and the area is
dominated and inhabited predominantly by people of the Igbo extraction. (Campbell,
2018). The IPOB and the people from this region feel marginalized by the Nigerian
military presence (i.e., Operation Python Dance), which they believed was designed to
intimidate the people and stifle their commercial activities. The lack of federal
government investment in the region and the lopsided federal government appointments
of the people of this region point to the solidity of these claims (Al Jazeera, 2017).
Amnesty International (2016) clarified that many IPOB supporters and associates
are young and vastly jobless and feel that they cannot achieve their societal goals and
God given possibilities without achieving independent Biafra. Meghan Turnbull (2017)
noted that young and unemployed men in particular are marching in IPOB rallies.
Turnbull (2017) submitted that for the IPOB the “IPOB, gained prominence after the
election of President Muhammadu Buhari, who was perceived as ‘at best dismissive and
at times hostile’ toward Nigerians in the South Eastern region.’ Tayo and Mbah (2017)
stated that the anti-Buhari sentiments in the region added to the visibility of the IPOB.
Mazi Nnamdi Kanu, the leader of IPOB was incarcerated on various charges including
sedition, which is tantamount death sentence (International Crisis Group, 2015;
Newsweek, 2017), and kept in confinement until April 2017 in spite of the law court
injunction gained for his release (Turnbull, 2017). Kanu's confinement and extra-judicial
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treatment, however, aided his rising fame and empathy amongst Nigerians and the global
community (Al Jazeera, 2017; Tayo & Mbah, 2017).
In an interview with the Agence France-Presse (2017), Kanu asserted:
“The objective and the ideals of IPOB are very straightforward, which is to
reinstate Biafra, to make sure Biafra emanates by any means possible.” Kanu
further stated that we have chosen the path of peaceful demonstration, nonaggression, persuasion, and good judgment. We are going to implement all of that
to make sure we realize Biafra. Our goal, continued Kanu, is freedom; and
plebiscite is the path we have chosen to take to achieve Biafra . . . There is no
option (p.22).
To ensure peaceful agitation but with a decisive demand for the emancipation of
the marginalized people of Biafra, the group appointed real and verifiable individuals as
leaders. This is at variance with the faceless Boko Haram terrorist group that the
government of Nigeria has repeatedly refused to proscribe or designate as a terrorist
group despite volumes of data detailing deaths and sorrows perpetrated by the group.
These are the leaders of the IPOB:
•

Nnamdi Kanu, IPOB leader and director of the London-based Radio Biafra
(Amnesty International, 2016).

•

Mazi Uche Okafor Mefor is the deputy leader (The Independent, 2017).

•

Mazi Chika Edoziem is the head of State Directorate of the IPOB (The
Independent, 2017).

•

Mr. Emma Powerful is the secretary media and publicity (The Guardian, 2017;
Vanguard, 2018).

29
Amnesty International (2016) stated that IPOB's undertakings are managed by state
chapters overseen by state coordinators, who are controlled by the senior directors. The
directorate of state oversees IPOB agents abroad (Amnesty International, 2016).
However, a statement by Kanu in May 2017 shows that several changes have been made
in the leadership of the group over the years. The IPOB run news internet site, popularly
known as “The Radio Biafra”, demonstrates that the ensuing administrative
developments have taken shape: the designation of director of coordinators has been
eliminated; the IPOB’s worldwide organizational head office is situated in Germany and
UK. The Radio Biafra UK, combined with satellite posts in Germany, South Africa, and
Malaysia and the coming new one in the United States, is the official conduit of
communication for the IPOB. Mazi Chika Edoziem and Uche Mefor are empowered to
convey and issue instructions on behalf of Kanu and the IPOB. Emma Powerful, the
director of communications, announced that the. ‘World administrative headquarters of
the IPOB was opened in Langenfeld, Germany in December 2017. Emma Powerful
specified that the IPOB's local liaison offices, that serve as regional place of contact,
continue to function in London, Tel Aviv, Ankara, New Delhi, and Los Angeles, but only
the organizational head office is approved to issue political directives under the
instruction of Edoziem (The Independent, 2017).
IPOB is well organized with radio transmission that extends to numerous
countries. The Radio Biafra is used to campaign for an autonomous Biafra (LA Times,
2019). The LA Times piece asserted that Radio Biafra was used to coordinate rallies,
including the embargo of the 2019 election, and to publicize important directives to
Biafra’s and their followers across the world. According to Amnesty International (2016),
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the broadcasts contain messages that "may comprise agitation to violent acts against the
Federal Republic of Nigerian" (p. 11), including the leader Mazi Nnamdi Kanu’s calling
for retaliation against the military by saying repeatedly, "we shall hunt them down, the
zoo republic soldiers, and kill them” (p. 12), soon after the Nigerian army killed two
IPOB colleagues and wounded 30 in August 2015. In spite of the rhetoric of Radio
Biafra, IPOB demonstrations were recorded by Amnesty International (2016) for their
2016 protests, which were mostly peaceful. Similarly, Turnbull (2017) stated that though
Radio Biafra's "'rhetoric has been seemingly violent' considering their stating that they
'needed guns and bullets,' but IPOB coordinated demonstrations has been 'largely
peaceful" (p. 30).
The IPOB ways of operation include protest and sit-at-home directives with other
pro-Biafra factions, as well as the Movement for the Actualization of the Sovereign State
of Biafra (MASSOB). This protest has never resulted in IPOB’s killing any member of
the public or an officer. Rather, it has been a way of pressuring the government to
approve a referendum that could lead to the actualization of a sovereign state of Biafra.
The Guardian (2017) noted that the Nigerian military in an excessive use of force against
the protest launched Operation Python Dance II, which began in September 2017 and was
set to last until October 2017 in the southeastern region to tackle and quench the IPOB
protest. The Nigerian army said the operation "was not directed at any individual or
group," however; the method of operation, the excessive force, and resultant deaths
suggested otherwise (Vanguard, 2017, p. 17). In the operation the military raided Nnamdi
Kanu's home as part of the operation, and approximately 20 IPOB members were shot
dead during the raid, even though the military denied the raid took place (Newsweek,
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2017; Tayo & Mbah, 2017). In overwhelming contrast to the misleading statement
released by the Nigeria Military, Amnesty International (2018) confirmed that ten IPOB
members were massacred and twelve wounded by the Nigerian army, and the military
disputed that the deaths occurred during their attempt to arrest Kanu at his home.
The Nigerian military labeled the IPOB as a terrorist group in September 2017,
citing the IPOB's formation of the Biafra Secret Service (BSS) and confrontations with
security forces as justifications (Reuters, 2017). However, the designation of IPOB as a
"terrorist" organization has been broadly rejected, particularly by international observers
(Human Rights Watch, 2019; Tayo & Mbah, 2017). The argument was predicated on a
political conspiracy. That Boko Haram has killed thousands of people, made several
attacks on government offices, and killed people at the UN Headquarters, along with the
Fulani extremists, yet has not been proscribed or designated by the same military
suggests conspiracy. Four IPOB associates arrested with Nnamdi Kanu in 2015 were
imprisoned and charged with dubious “treasonable felony" (Campbell, 2018; The Punch,
2018) or "preparations to break away from Nigeria” (Vanguard, 2018). Nearly 100
women in Owerri, Imo State were detained during an August 2018 protest concerning the
whereabouts of Nnamdi Kanu (Human Rights Watch, 2019; Premium Times, 2018). The
women were arrested and arraigned with treason and unauthorized gathering, sparking an
upheaval and calls for their release from rights groups (Premium Times, 2018; Sahara
Reporters, 2018). The women were released after six days in custody (Human Rights
Watch, 2019; Premium Times, 2018; Sahara Reporters, 2018). Moreover, these threats
and incessant arrests of IPOB members, 51 people alleged of being IPOB members were
apprehended in December 2018 as they "were allegedly preparing for a Jewish service
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within the premises of the leader of IPOB, Mazi Nnamdi Kanu," in Umuahia (The
Guardian, 2019). More arrests were made during a procession through the streets that
started in the Afaraukwu community, from which Kanu hails, as they were demonstrating
for an independent Jewish state (Vanguard, 2018)
In contrast to the treatment given to the internationally acknowledged terrorist
organization Boko Haram by the government, the International Society for Civil Liberties
and Rule of Law (Intersociety), a Nigerian civil society and human rights group, as
quoted in the Sun, stated that 140 defenseless and nonviolent IPOB members and
supporters were arrested at a military and police checkpoint while going to a funeral,
tortured, and then arraigned in court were the court decided it did not have jurisdiction to
hear the case and ordered them to be committed to prison (The Sun, 2019). The Sun
newspaper further asserted that the detained members did not get a trial date two weeks
after their arraignments.
More so, 140 people were arrested by the Enugu State Joint Security Patrol Teams,
mainly for being in possession of Biafra insignias including flags and bangles (WHO,
2019). All the one hundred and forty individuals were arrested and arraigned with
terrorism and were sent to jail by the magistrate court while they wait for their case to be
called up at the High Court (News Express, 2019). The ceaseless attack on the IPOB and
the defenseless civilian supporters of the group, some who have died at the hands of the
Nigerian military who were paid to protect them, begs the question: who is the terrorist,
the IPOB, Nigerian military, or Boko Haram?
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Fulani Herdsmen
Violence by the Fulani herdsmen has continued to cause a heavy humanitarian toll
with thousands murdered and several thousand displaced. In Benue state one, of the most
affected states, more than 1,878 Nigerians were killed from 2014–2016 (Ajibo, 2018).
Over 62,000 people have been displaced in Kaduna, Plateau, and Benue states. In the
absence of internally displaced person camps, many sought shelters in rural communities
and poor areas, straining already scarce resources (Internal Crisis Group, 2017).
Herdsmen and farmers have remained the greatest users of resources in Nigeria (Ajuwon,
2004).
The Fulani herdsmen are cattle raisers involved in private business in Nigeria.
Among the Fulanis, it epitomizes their main source of livelihood. President Buhari, as a
Fulani, owns a fair share of the cattle business in his capacity as a private citizen. Given
this attachment not only to his tribal main source of livelihood and the needfulness to
protect his brothers, it becomes politically impossible for Buhari to take a decisive action
against his kinsmen, who are roving hazardously with sophisticated AK-47’s hanging
loosely across their shoulders to terrorize their civilian victims.
Their victims are mainly farmers. Adetula (2006) noted that “previously the
herdsmen were known to wreak havoc in certain communities in Nigeria, but now the
rate at which they are committing these crimes has increased exponentially.” In January
2013, Fulani herdsmen attacked some villages in Nasarawa state, killing over 10 people,
and over 500 people were displaced in the process. Duru (2016, p. 2) reported a gruesome
attack on the Agatu community in which six villages were driven out from their domain
and over 7,000 people displaced. The International Crisis Group (2017) reported an
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estimated 2,500 displaced people arising from the attack of the herdsmen. Several
thousands of Nigerians have been murdered, communities have been destroyed, and
many farmers and herdsmen have lost their lives and properties in an unmitigated
massacre (Gambari et al., 2018).
The truth is that the present government has done nothing to stop or tame the
Fulani herdsmen. Many well – meaning Nigerians see it as a systemic plan by the
Fulani’s to further Islamize Nigeria through encroachment, intimidation, and domination,
but this is still to be proven. No organized group armed with AK-47 guns embarked on
such a murderous rampage should be allowed to thrive or be given special treatment.
Comparatively, Kanu and the pro-Biafra from eastern Nigeria have not come close to the
heinous, murderous actions of what the Miyetti Allah had done, and yet IPOB was
expeditiously dealt with in a military war manner of Operation Python Dance and
proscribed as a terrorist group by the Buhari-led federal government.
Causes of Terrorism
Crenshaw (1981) posited that terrorist groups make deliberate decisions to engage
in the act of terrorism and argued that terrorism is caused by “political behavior resulting
from the deliberate choice of a basically rational actor.” Crenshaw further suggested that
terrorism is a logical choice when the power ratio of government to challenger is high.
Onwudiwe, et al., (2016) stated that “the scourge of the terrorist attack and activities have
continued to weaken the Nigerian character or moral fiber.” Onwudiwe and his
colleagues further stated that government efforts to combat terrorism in Nigeria must
include remedies that would be properly and prudently applied. The discussion and
question among scholars are whether the Boko Haram insurgency was founded based on
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strictly Islamic ideology or rather on the ideological notion of imposing an Islamic
caliphate on an established secular society. If the latter is the fundamental ideology, then
the consequence would be summarized as ‘Islamization via terrorist approach.’ Forest
(2012) submitted that Boko Haram chiefly is the creation of a prevalent socio-economic
and religious insecurity whose consequences resonate among several communities in the
northern region. If these were the core reasons for the sudden insurgency, Okoli (2014, p.
40) had these questions for the insurgents and other scholars:
If the region for several decades has co-existed with these ills without conflict,
why are the ills (pervasive poverty, endemic corruption, inequality, injustice,
youth unemployment, and absence of good governance) now serving as a catalyst
for the emergence and spread of Boko Haram insurgency.
Politics and Terrorism
According to the African Human Rights Law Journal (2016), some politicians in
the state of Bornu in Nigeria were clearly using the services of the Boko Haram sect as
their political thugs against their perceived political opponents and enemies. The political
elites later became fearful as the sect emerged very powerful, destructive, and apparently
beyond their control. The Bornu politicians under the leadership of Governor Ali Modu
Sheriff, who had vehemently denied his involvement with the sect, invited the
government to deal with the sect.
Political and Criminological Conspiracies
Article 5, being the cornerstone of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization
(NATO) stated that an attack on one member is an attack on all the members. This
statement however, got traction with terrorism ravaging the world; and leaders came
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together with the strong term that when terrorist attacks any country, especially the
NATO members, others would respond appropriately, to deter future attacks. However,
that has not been the case around the world. This treaty was only invoked once after the
attack on Pentagon in September 2011. The response of the superpowers to the above
stated assumption has been Orwellian at best. Before the carnage of 2011 on American
soil, terrorist attacks have been heard all over the world, but none could be as dastardly as
9/11. The world shook, people wept, and the memory will continue to remain indelible.
After 9/11, terrorist attacks have not ceased. Blood has continued to flow, dismembered
human bodies have continued to litter the streets, and suicide bombers have continued to
terrorize countries like Nigeria. Yet the publicity and actions taken to reduce the attacks
both by Nigerian government and international community has remained dubious.
Nigeria may not be a NATO member, but the strategic position of the country politically
and economically should be of immense significance to the peace of the continent and the
world. The attention of the western powers should be directed more on the safety of the
people and the country and not only on the crude oil exploration and exploitation in
Nigeria.
The Boko Haram in Nigeria was the world’s deadliest terrorist group of 2014,
second deadliest in 2015, and is one of the most perplexing terrorist groups to arise in the
past 50 years (GTI 2015). Greenfield (2015) after observing the carnage and wanton
destruction of human lives, charred remains of humans lying unattended and dead in the
streets of Nigeria- asked “do African lives matter?” There is rarely a protest when we
hear that Africans have been killed on the continent of Africa. Greenfield further stated
that “There’s rarely a protest every single day when we don’t hear that Boko Haram is
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killing people. We get protests in front of state department all the time -protesting all
kinds of human rights violations. Protest people being killed on the continent by
terrorists. We all need to hear the voices of the people. Ordinary men and women in
Africa, the United States, and abroad need to raise their voices and send an unmistakable
message that Boko Haram’s violence is intolerable, and it is unacceptable. The outcry
internationally and in Nigeria over the kidnapping of the Chibok schoolgirls was
impressive -but it was slow. We waited to hear what people would say. Those protests,
once they started, helped greatly to raise awareness of Boko Haram’s brutality. But they
were only a start” (Greenfield 2015).
As stated above, Nigeria and the world must do more. Moss (2018) stated that
while the western world continues to focus on Daesh (al-Dawla al-Islamiya fi al-Iraq wa
al-Sham) in the Middle East, Boko Haram has become smarter, more efficient, and so
deadly that in 2015, they had the second highest death toll of all terrorist groups since
2000. Yet the world is largely silent. Moss further stated that time has come where the
world can no longer turn blind eyes to the atrocities being carried out by Boko Haram,
and the conspiracy warrants further studying, which is exactly what this dissertation is all
about.
Complacency and Inept Leadership
Zenn (2014) stated that the attacks, suicide bombing, and violence re-emergence
by the Boko Haram have witnessed systemic increases since 2010. Their activities have
continued to expand, even beyond the national boundaries. However, the increasing
complacency of the federal government in the face of rapid expansion and strategy by
Boko Haram caused more harm to the populace. Anyadike (2014) posited that the
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changing dynamic of the operations and the tactics of the group bewildered many
scholars and analysts. The government was equally confused owing to the change in their
initial strategy which targeted military formations and security personnel. The group
diversified their mode of operation by further expanding their attacks to include nongovernmental targets, civilians, and the general populace.

Impact of Terrorism in Nigeria
The advent of Boko Haram terrorism into the Nigerian political space has brought
about a public insecurity. Ideologically, as the only internationally recognized terrorist
group in Nigeria, Boko Haram suggests that Western education and interaction with the
Western world are strictly forbidden (Zumve, et al., 2013). The Boko Haram terrorists
also propose the establishment of the Islamic caliphate and Sharia justice system as
opposed to the secular state of Nigeria. The group followed it up with a campaign of
suicide bombing, arson, and mass shooting of their victims in the churches, parks,
embassies, and the UN building, a major phenomenon witnessed for the first time in the
history of Nigeria (Okoli, 2014). The escalation of Boko Haram’s clandestine activities,
especially in the Northeastern part of Nigeria, brought about untold hardship and death.
Civil normalcy has eluded the cities of Adamawa, Bornu, Yobe, and different parts of
Nigeria (Salkida, 2012). Also, the introduction of Fulani herdsmen has continued to
spread unmitigated and uncontrollable terror to all the nooks and crannies of the country.
While the government has remained silent and helpless in the face of systemic
annihilation of the people of the north central and the south, the rampaging Fulani
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herdsmen have not relented in unleashing death and sorrow on the people of Nigeria in
their farms and homes.
Aside from the Nigeria/Biafra war from 1967–1970, no catastrophe or event of
immensely devastating proportion has been as debilitating and destructive in terms of
humanitarian impacts as Boko Haram terrorist activities against the Nigerian state.
According to Okoli (2018), the humanitarian implications and devastating impacts of the
Boko Haram insurrection have been remarkable and historically unprecedented. Salkida
(2012) posited that the activities of these terror groups have created an unpleasant
atmosphere of civil siege and immeasurable volatility. Moreover, the notable implication
of all these for public peace, security, and safety has been critically ominous.
The consequence of the terrorist activities of the Boko Haram and the Fulani
herdsmen include the crisis of livelihood. Their activities and the counterintelligence by
the government have practically turned the area of Yobe, Adamawa, and Bornu into war
zones. Economic activities cannot thrive in an environment with such volatility.
Communities have been driven into hiding for fear of being killed. This has impacted not
only the economic activities but also welfare and general health of the community. Zenn
(2014) stated that the violence resulting from the Boko Haram insurgency has created a
serious menace to the security system of the country and her political corporate entity.
The impact of the terrorist groups of Boko Haram and Fulani herdsmen are
undermining the cooperate existence of Nigeria as one political entity. The Boko Haram
group at a time captured several local government areas in the state of Bornu, Yobe, and
Adamawa. The Fulani herdsmen have deprived people of their lands and farms, causing
fear and desertion for the fear of invading Fulanis. The major onslaught of the Fulani
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herdsmen in some parts of the Eastern region and the southwest has resulted in divisions
and fear of what the real intentions of the Fulani’s are. Moreover, the deafening silence of
Buhari, a group leader has laid credence to the notion of a conspiracy. Given this same
group came from the same region as Boko Haram. Onuoha (2014) observed that Boko
Haram through its activities has become a threat to the national security of Nigeria, and
its clandestine activities have impacted the society and the lives of many in the country.
Refugee disaster and population dislodgment have been the bane of the Boko
Haram and Fulani herdsmen insurgency in the states affected. The activities of these
terrorist groups have led to a vast human population displacement in several states in
Nigeria. Adebowale (2013) stated that the terrorist’s insurgency in Nigeria has resulted in
the huge displacement of no fewer than 5,000 people from several states in the Northeast
of Nigeria. Adebowale further confirmed based on the report of the United Nations
Humanitarian Commission on Refugees that over 10,000 Nigerians have sought refuge in
the neighboring countries of Chad, Niger, and Cameroon. The plights of these displaced
people are better imagined in the strange lands where they found themselves, considering
that they have lost their social cleavages, their environments they have been attached to
since birth. The recent figures emanating from the National Emergency Management
Agency (NEMA) show that over 16,470 Nigerians have been displaced, arising from
“conflicts and ethnoreligious crises and emerging terrorism” (Alkassim, 2013. p.10).

Economic Depreciation
Terrorism and insecurity in Nigeria have retarded the nation’s economic and
technological advancement. Many Nigerians live in constant fear and pain from the loss

41
of killed loved ones. People live every day in suspicion and tensions arising from the
menace of the Boko Haram and Fulani herdsmen. (Omede & Omede, 2015) submitted
that many productive lives have been lost, while available ones have been displaced.
Omede’s further stated that national development and other social -economic, and
religious advancement of the country have been hampered because of the menace of
these terror groups. Tolu and Abe (2011) observed that the nefarious activities of Boko
Haram and Fulani herdsmen have created an economic backwardness in Nigeria.
Theoretical Framework
Anomie Theory
Anomie is applied in this dissertation to explain why terrorism in Nigeria has
assumed the proportion of social normlessness and pervasiveness. Emile Durkheim
(1897–1951) has applied “anomie” to refer to a state of anomie, which suggests
normlessness or a total breakdown of societal norms. Durkheim also described such a
society as one that lacks social regulation. It could be social regulation of the resources of
the country as in Nigeria. Where the Niger Delta region communities are in a state of
despair. Their physical environment is not reflecting its enormous resources. Youths’
normal ways of life have been changed as they can no longer fish in their God-given
water because of oil spillage and unmitigated industrial pollution. Such normlessness
could only breed violence and militant agitation. Several scholars have also observed that
the structure of the society created criminal behavior. In contemporary society it is one of
the factors that encourage a higher rate of criminal behaviors including militancy and
political gangsterism. Durkheim reasoned that crime is a common phenomenon and
practical to any given society (Farr & Moscovici, 1984). These factors propelled,
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Durkheim to believe that social needs and desires are insatiable; therefore, an external
regulating force is required to control the goal-seeking behavior. Durkheim stressed the
concept of the nature of man. His viewpoint was impacted profoundly by his belief in
human nature. Durkheim found that members of a society need some rules and order that
will deter them, knowing that human beings are complex, and if no law is implemented to
restrain individuals’ activities, the society will become anomic, which is a total
deregulation of societal norms or normlessness.
The Nigerian social structure has encouraged criminal behaviors. The society is
presumed to be an anomic society giving the definition of anomie theory (Durkheim,
1951). Nigerian society pretends to operate under the umbrella of democracy even though
it is a country of anarchy devoid of the common practice of democratic ethos. Nigeria is a
nation that lacks orderliness in the corridors of power, due to the absence of political will
and sensible governmental authority. The government is assumed to be functioning in
absolute liberty, and continuously exploits the apparent flexibility of the people’s
mindset. Nigerian society is functioning in a state of normlessness; there is no proper law
and order that regulates the activities of government officials down to non-governmental
officials. The Judiciary, Legislative, and Executive down to public officials are breaking
and deregulating down the societal rules, which has generated corruption that has eaten
up the country’s socio-economic fabric like cancer.
This level of corruption can only breed violence in the society. Durkheim argued that the
moral order of any giving society was more vibrant than the economic order. Durkheim
further observed that for the economy of any society to flourish and youth violence or
terrorism is averted, there must be a specific form of recognized rules, laws, and
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regulations to safeguard the wealth and the financial system of such a society. Anomie is
brought about by a collapse of the society’s capability to regulate the natural appetites of
the people. The main challenge of Nigeria since her independence in 1960 to the present
is disorder, deprivation, and provincialism. Lawlessness brings sectionalism and
violence, which culminates in utter deprivation. The result is agitation and militancy as a
way of obtaining the deprived societal goals. These problems have continued to escalate
to the breaking point. The behavioral offspring from a society that is dominated by
normlessness, and morally deficient individuals can only produce bad governance,
unemployment, exploitation, domination, display of materialism with impunity, lack of
quality education, corruption and corrupt practices, ethnic superiority, ethnic agitation,
and violence. Nigeria is a nation befuddled with disorder. The government officials and
political leaders misappropriated and siphon off the country’s funds and keep the treasure
to themselves and their families without any form of criminal liability, unlike in the more
advanced nations where the system has put in place a legal framework that administers
and regulates the cravings of the government representatives and the members of the
society. Such unbridle kleptocracy leads to failure in the distribution of basic social and
economic welfare. Opposition and violence would ultimately not be ruled out. Petroleum
products, which are the source of the mono-economy of the country, have been licensed
to be lifted and be supplied by those close to the corridors of power. This high level of
nationally organized fraud affects the people’s lives. Especially the Niger Delta region
that would readily take up arms against the government for tapping the resources on their
land, yet they do not have access roads and good infrastructures. In other countries, no
one can siphon the country’s wealth without facing a criminal liability because there are
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regulations that guide the interests of everybody irrespective of the status of such a
personality.
Strain Theory
Strain theory states that strains in the society lead to the tendency to engage in
anti-social and aggressive behaviors. Merton (1938) underscored this in the social
structure. Merton believed that the success and failure of any society is based on the
structure of such society. Merton’s work showed that in every society there are
“culturally defined goals, purposes, and interests.” Merton suggested also that there are
generally “accepted modes of achieving these goals.” Those who cannot achieve the
means for getting culturally defined and institutionalized goals, under societal pressure,
are conditioned to engage in unacceptable behaviors. The NDA felt that they deserved
control over the oil that is being taken from their environment. However, the law made it
impossible for them. NDA members observed other members of society living large on
the resources from their community. The group also observed that oil blocks from their
community were shared among politicians when the owners do not have good roads and
piped in water. These have led the group to agitate for a fair distribution of the resources
from their community. Such agitation usually takes the form of destroying pipelines and
kidnapping expatriates. Merton (1957) and Chinoy (1967) maintained that society
establishes goals for groups, and individuals and the same society defines the means of
attaining these goals. Unfortunately, there are individuals whose means, education,
family background, and education are not enough to achieve the culturally defined goals
set by the society. This could lead to unethical behaviors and devising any available
means to achieve these societal goals.
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The main theme of strain theory with respect to criminality and deviant behavior
confirms that criminal behavior is a function of an overemphasis on the objectives
associated with gathering of wealth, as well as a disconnection between the goals
esteemed by a society and the means accessible for individuals to achieve them (Merton,
1957). The primary instrument through which criminality and deviance behavior are
embraced has its source in goals and divergences, whether it is because of an overemphasis on social goals or goal obstacle (Murphy & Robinson, 2008).
Strain theory is used in this research to explain why most people in Nigeria are
involved in different kinds of criminal behavior and protest. Nigerian society establishes
a value system, mindsets, and beliefs from its citizens and communities without
considering the means of achieving them, or the income disparity involved (Ijewereme,
2015). This strain could produce misery and lead individuals who are suffering to be
involved in corrupt behavior to attain the opportunities of society. Many could be used by
politicians as thugs and terrorists against a perceived opponent.
In Nigeria, wealth, regardless of how ill-gotten is usually glorified. Those who
could not attain the expected societal goals usually got involved in any activity that could
guarantee them assess to a glamorized life in the public. People salute and applaud you
when you have amassed wealth, gaining success, getting ahead, and making the money at
any cost; the society does not appear to be concerned with how the success is attained.
Merton strain theory which is very much operational in Nigeria. Merton (1938)
discovered five “logically possible, different modes of adaptation by individuals” to the
social condition of anomie.” According to Merton, people who do not have the prospect
of attaining legitimate institutionalized aspirations adapt to unlawful means of achieving
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those aspirations. The first adaptation is conformity. In this, individual accepts the
cultural objectives of society and the established means of attaining them. Another type
of adaptation is innovation. The individual accepts the culturally appropriate goals of
society but engages in them through illegitimate means. Innovation is functioning in
Nigeria. This is where individuals are predisposed to different kinds of deviant behavior.
As long as they make it, people still salute them for being rich without questioning how
the wealth was made. A graduate from the reputable university in Nigeria who continues
searching for genuine jobs for five years or more could easily adapt to any unlawful
means for survival because the lawful means of achieving ends meet is prevented by the
powerful people in the society. The third type of adaptation is ritualism. An individual
gives up the effort to get ahead and focusses on retaining whatever little has been
acquired by conforming to the rules. Another type of adaptation is retreatism. The
individual in this case has giving up on both the objectives and the effort to achieve them.
Merton depicted this individual as vagabonds, drug addicts and alcoholics and ruthlessly
mentally challenged. Rebellion is the last form of adaptation. The person would have
rejected both the goals and the means of attaining the socially defined goals. This person
has created a new social order. The individual rebels against society and could get
involved in any form of violence to achieve his goal.
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Social Identity Theory
Social identity theory was developed by Henri Tajfel (1971) to explain in-group
preferentialism and bias. The theory can help individuals analyze the differences and
similarities between groups. Essential tools in developing a cultural perspective on the ingroup relations of this theory include social beliefs and social structures. Tajfel suggested
that in-group members might feel pride and self-esteem. People can feel good about
themselves by improving group values and philosophy. People can also share hobbies,
values, and interests, which help people have a sense of belonging within their groups
(Tajfel & Turner, 1979).
The social identity attributes the basis of in-group favoritism to a need for positive
particularity and perceived group status, validity, stability, and absorbency (Tajfel
&Turner, 1979). However, the in-group might separate and exclude the out-group and
hold prejudgment or racism against other groups. The social comparison means after
individuals classify themselves within a group and recognize themselves as being
members of that group, they might be inclined to compare themselves with another group
and against another group.
The Fulani herdsmen and farmer conflict provides a clearer picture of social
identity theory. If Fulani herdsmen identify as a group, they will most likely behave
within the patterns of that group. Fulani herdsmen have their tradition and culture which
could be distinct from other cultures. Farmers could also consider them susceptible and
believe in their rights to safeguarding their property and safely living in their
communities without out-group conflicts. They would have the same goals to safeguard
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their social identity and might be determined to prevent other groups from infringing on
their lands (Gordon, 2000)

Labeling Theory
Labeling theory is also applied in this dissertation to describe how the IPOB has
been labeled as a terrorist and deviant group, even though they are not, by the Nigerian
government. According to Cole et al. (2016), labeling theories stress that causes of
criminal behavior are created not in the individual but in the social process that labels
certain acts as deviant. Becker (1963) observed that society manufactures deviance and,
therefore, criminality “by making the rules whose infraction constitutes deviance and by
applying those rules to particular people and labeling them outsiders” (p.9).
IPOB has never acted like a terrorist group because they are not. Akers (1967)
discovered that labeling theorists were overly deterministic, avoiding offender’s
responsibility. Therefore, the decision by Nigeria government to label IPOB a terrorist
organization was overly deterministic.
The IPOB are asking for a stake in Nigeria’s political space and economy. The
IPOB is only asking to be allowed to go for self-determination after years of sociopolitical and economic deprivation and the marginalization of their region. According to
Ibifuro (2015):
Conflict is as a result of frustration when ‘legitimate desires’ of a person or group
have been denied them either directly or indirectly as a result of the way the
society is structured. The feeling of disappointment may lead such a man or group
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to express anger through violence that will be directed at those held responsible.
This anger and violence can also be directed to people who are directly or
indirectly related to those people that are said to be responsible (p.15).
The social construction of crime is the nature of the societal reaction and the
reality it constructs—not the immutable nature per se—that determines whether a crime
has occurred (Becker, 1963; Erikson, 1963) This simply means that the Nigerian
government determines and labels less powerful groups in the society as a terrorists’
organization and leaves groups like Boko Haram and Fulani herdsmen who are really
terrorists’ groups unlabeled. This answers the questions that were asked by labeling
theorists, “Who labels deviant acts?” Is it the powerful elites? The people who control
power determine the group that is labeled as terrorists even though such a group might
not be a terrorists’ organization. Becker (1963) stated:
Social groups create deviance by making the rules whose infraction
Constitutes deviance, and by applying those rules to particular people and
Labeling them as outsiders. From this point of view, deviance is not a quality
Of the act the person commits, but rather a consequence of the application by
Others of rules and sanctions to an “offender.” The deviant is one to whom that
label has successfully been applied; deviant behavior is behavior that people
so, labelled (p. 9).
According to Becker, the deviant is the one to whom that label has successfully
been applied (e.g., IPOB) and who has been stigmatized and labeled as a terrorists’ group
in Nigeria. While Boko Haram and Fulani herdsmen who kill thousands of Nigerians
every day have not been tagged nor labeled as terrorists in the country. Therefore,
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according to Becker, deviant behavior is behavior that the powerful elite and interest
groups in the society are sanctioned and labeled as deviant. However, I am applying this
theory to let the entire world know the unfair treatment, and evil stigmatization tag
against the IPOB. The world knew about Boko Haram as terrorists that bomb thousands
of innocent Nigerians to their untimely graves. Despite the pains and sorrows caused to
the people of Nigeria, the government has not proscribed or designated them as terrorists.
Instead, IPOB is tagged and labeled as terrorists.
Theory of Structural Violence
Theory of structural violence aids people in travel with structural violence in the
context of inequality, poverty, and reasonable access to resources (Disabil, 2017).
According to Galtung (1990), many circumstances are the result of an abuse of power,
which concerns a group or a social injustice. The theory of structural violence helps
explain the root cause of the conflict and illustrates different conflict factors. In this
conflict between the deadly Fulani herdsmen and farmers, farmers have support from the
local government (Galtung, 1990). Alternatively, the herdsmen can also be considered the
dominant party if they form militias and are armed with weapons (Disabil, 2017).
Echoing the position of Disabil, the Fulani herdsmen have become a dominant group,
given their coordinated attacks and ensuing mayhem that have been unleashed on their
defenseless victims.
Realistic Conflict Theory
The theory of realistic conflict should assist in analyzing the drivers of the
conflict. In this case the conflict is among the deadly and vicious Fulani herdsmen and
farmers, the Boko Haram terrorist, and the populace. This theory suggests that
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preconceptions can arise as a result of competition between groups for scarce resources,
the power, or territory as in the case of Boko Haram, a terrorist group that has continued
to fight against the people and government of Nigeria. Boko Haram has continued to
insist that Western education is taboo and unacceptable to the group. The group also
seeks the Islamize the sovereign country of Nigeria. The group has also ceased the
territory called the Sambisa forest. This theory states that whenever two groups are
seeking the same resources, it will lead to conflict (Baumeister & Vohs, 2007). Resource
scarcity, climate, and resource depletion could impact the decision-making of parties.
Pressures of climate change and poor economic performance could weaken states and
make the population more vulnerable, which reduces the capacity to manage conflict
(Ramsbotham et al., 2016). According to Baumeister and Vohs, different beliefs,
prejudices, and discrimination between groups can potentially initiate conflicts between
Fulani herders and farmers. This theory explains how intergroup hostility and conflicting
goals triggered violent reactions among various groups.
When dialogs between leaders and social activities were unsuccessful, the deadly
Fulani group and farmers have to call on political power, military protection, or social
status to augment their bargaining position (Jay, 1993). This theory will also assist people
to understand the importance of enabling long-term friendships and reducing intergroup
tension. Examining the material factors behind this conflict will help policymakers to
work out how to provide for needs and balance concerns for both parties.

CHAPTER 3
METHODOLOGY
The research methods applied for this study of the “political and criminological
conspiracy of terrorism” a case study of Nigeria; is demonstrated in this chapter. Great
importance will be placed on the following areas: method of data collection, research
design, case selection, data validation, and method of data analysis.
Research Design
The single-instrument case study method was used for this study. According to
Creswell (2007), “this method involves focusing on a particular issue by using a bounded
single case to conduct an in-depth research on a more general subject,” in this case, the
incidence of political and criminological conspiracy of terrorism in Nigeria.
The single bounded case study was chosen for two main reasons. Firstly, to add
more recognition to the prevalent nature of terrorism in Nigeria, this methodology can be
applied to underscore the destructive nature of the political and criminological conspiracy
of terrorism in the country. Secondly, it simplifies the study of the research problem,
gathering applicable data, examining information, and recording the results in efficient
manner (Singleton & Straits, 2010). This approach was applied to achieve a better
knowledge of the problem and to reveal areas that need to be concentrated on in the
foreseeable future.
One of the drawbacks of conducting case study research is the identification of
the case. The researcher must make decisions related to the definition of the bounded
study and the size of the purposive sample population study. Most case study designs
consist of a small sample population, thus limiting the ability to generalize the findings to
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a larger population. The researcher is a vital component of case study research, researcher
bias must be recognized and handled in an ethical manner.
Case Selection
This study used secondary sources as the main method of data collection. The
application of secondary sources of data is justified because it’s importance in data
collection technique with a long tradition of use in social science research. For any study
to be significantly reliable, scientific proofs and ideas must be accompanied by
experimentation. Descriptive analysis of the Global Terrorism Index, which covers
integrity report, and levels of terrorism in several regions in Nigeria such as IPOB in the
east, NDA in the south, Boko Haram and Fulani herdsmen in the north, and OPC in the
west Nigeria. This research will use tables and charts to analyze data and to analyze the
Global Terrorism Index of Nigeria from 2007–2017.
“Case study research is a qualitative approach in which the researcher investigates
a single bounded system or multiple systems over time through thorough, in-depth data
gathering relating multiple sources of information, like interviews, observations,
audiovisual material, documents, and reports on a case description and case-based
themes” (Creswell, 2007). Others have presented the case study as a strategy of inquiry, a
methodology, or a comprehensive research strategy (Denzin & Lincoln, 2005; Merriam,
1988). According to Merriam (1988), “There is no standard format for reporting case
study research” (p. 193). Some case studies generate theory, some are simply descriptions
of cases, and others are more analytical in nature and display cross-case (Creswell 2007,
p. 94).
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The Global Terrorism Index is a report published annually and shows the trends
of terrorism around the world. The index makes available the comprehensive summary
analysis of the major patterns and trends in terrorism starting from year 2000. It further
provided a compound score in the ordinal ranking of countries to portray the reality and
impact of terrorism. The index combined several factors connected with terrorist attacks
to develop a clearer picture of the impact of terrorism, demonstrating trends, and making
available data sequenced for the consumption of policymakers and researchers.
The GTI is centered on data collected from the Global Terrorism Database that is
also collected by the National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Responses to
Terrorism at the University of Maryland. The Global Terrorism Database has
successfully coded over 150,000 terrorism cases.
Methodology of Data Collection
The data used in this research came from the GTI measurements. The ranking of
36 known countries where terrorism that have experienced terrorism is based on data
from the GTD and other sources. The GTI is annually published by the renowned
Institute for Economics and Peace (IEP). The report provides a comprehensive summary
of the major global developments and patterns in terrorism. The GTI report was
published first in 2012. It is an effort to rank nations of the world systematically based on
the terrorist activity. The index combines several factors associated with terrorist attacks
to create an explicit image of the impact of terrorism, demonstrating trends and providing
a data sequence for analysis by researchers and policymakers. Below is the list of data
checklist, according to Stake’s critique checklist (1995).
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Data Validation
The quality of the research documents and reports that were used in this study
were based on this checklist.
1. How easy and simple is the report?
2. The conceptual nature of the report
3. Does the study match the sentences contributing to the whole?
4. How effectively are the quotations used?
5. Are they presented in serious and scholarly manner?
6. How effectively are figures, headings, artifacts, indexes applied?
7. Has the reader been provided with some explicit experiences?
8. How well was it edited and polished?
9. Were sufficient data presented?
10. Was sufficient concern given to various contexts?
11. Were data resources well-chosen and in adequate number?
12. Do observations and explanations seem to have been triangulated?
13. Has the researcher made intelligent claims and interpretation?
14. Is the nature of the expected audience obvious?
15. Are the position and view of the researcher clear?
16. Is understanding displayed for all sides?
17. Is there a feeling of story to the study?
18. Are individual intentions investigated?
19. Is the case sufficiently delineated?
20. Does it give the impression that persons were exposed to risk?
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Summary
This chapter has presented the methodology for this study, providing lucidity on
the structure of this study. It described the key parts of this study, especially the case
selection, research design, methods for data collection, and analysis, while working
jointly to address the fundamental research questions of the study. In the ensuing chapter,
the evaluation and results from the data gathered for this study are presented.

CHAPTER 4
DATA ANALYSIS AND RESULTS
This chapter explains in detail first, the methods applied to collect data, second,
the descriptive qualitative design of the Global Terrorism Index (GTI), and third, the
tables used to analyze the study findings and results, and finally, the study’s conclusions.
Data Collection
For this research, secondary data were applied. It came from the GTI
measurement and Amnesty International. The data rankings were based on data from the
GTD ranking of 36 major countries that have witnessed significant terrorist attacks. The
GTI report is produced by the Institute for Economic and Peace, using data from the GTD
and other sources. The IEP is an independent, nonprofit organization committed to
shifting the world’s attention to peace as a positive, achievable, and concrete measure of
human wellbeing and progress.
The GTI is a report published yearly by the IEP. The index provides a
comprehensive review of the key global developments and patterns in terrorism. It is an
attempt to methodically rank the nations of the world according to terrorist activity. The
index joins several factors associated with terrorist attacks to build an explicit image of
the effect of terrorism, demonstrating trends and providing a data series for analysis by
researchers and policymakers. Also, this organization generates an annual report on
Nigeria that evaluates the assessment of government on terrorism in the country based on
various data collected on the terrorist activities in the country (Stewart, 2012).
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Table 1. Global Terrorism Index 2019, Top 36 Terrorized Countries
COUNTRY
Afghanistan
Iraq
Nigeria
Syria
Pakistan
Somalia
India
Yemen
Philippines
DRC
Egypt
Libya
Mali
CAR
Cameroon
Turkey
South Sudan
Thailand
Colombia
Sudan
Kenya
USA
Niger
Ukraine
Mozambique
Myanmar
Burkina Faso
United Kingdom
Ethiopia
Saudi Arabia
Bangladesh
Palestine
Burundi
Nepal
Indonesia
France

Rank
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32
33
34
35
36

10-Points
9.6
9.24
8.6
8.01
7.89
7.8
7.52
7.26
7.14
7.04
6.79
6.77
6.65
6.62
6.62
6.53
6.32
6.03
5.91
5.81
5.76
5.69
5.6
5.55
5.54
5.51
5.42
5.41
5.35
5.24
5.21
5.18
5.1
5.09
5.07
5.01

Percentile
26.7%
25.7%
23.9%
22.25%
21.9%
21.7%
20.9%
20.1%
19.8%
19.5%
18.9%
18.8%
18.5%
18.4%
18.4%
18.1%
17.5%
16.8%
16.4%
16.1%
16.0%
15.8%
15.5%
15.41%
15.4%
15.3%
15.1%
15.0%
14.8%
14.5%
14.4%
14.3%
14.2%
14.1%
14.0%
13.9%

Source: GTI = Global Terrorism Index
The statistics indicated the top 36 most terrorized countries as ranked by the
Global Terrorism Index for 2019, which ranks the countries of the world based on their
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terrorist activities. Afghanistan is ranked number one on the GTI with a leading score of
9.6 points and 26.7%. This makes the country the most terrorized country in the whole
world. Table 1 also shows an empirical analysis of the GTI ranking of Nigeria in 2019,
which indicates how endemic terrorism has been in Nigeria. As seen in Table 1, in 2019,
36 countries were examined, and Nigeria was the third-most terrorized country with an
8.6-point index and 23.9%.
The GTI in 2015, published by the reputable IEP discovered that Boko Haram,
the Nigerian the internationally recognized jihadist terrorist group, was responsible for
6,644 deaths in 2014 compared to 6,073 at the hands of ISIS. Boko Haram, the
fundamentalist radical Islamic sect from northern Nigeria has been responsible for a
string of bomb attacks since 2009. These attacks were tactically directed at the Nigerian
populace, security officials, churches, civilians, and the UN headquarters in Abuja
(Uzodike & Maiangwa, 2012).
This study was not in any way intended to make comparison among the terrorized
countries of the world but rather to statistically prove with empirical data the conspiracy
involved in labeling one group a terrorist group and shying away from labeling one of the
world’s most dangerous group, Boko Haram, by the Nigerian government. Boko Haram
was primarily responsible for the unenviable position of Nigeria on the terrorism index
table. There were 5,686 more people killed from terrorism in 2014 than in 2013, “a huge
increase of almost 300 percent to 7,512, which is largely due to the increasing
ruthlessness of Boko Haram” (GTI, 2015, p. 4).
From these viewpoints, Boko Haram is both a terrorist and insurgent organization
that uses guerrilla strategies to draw attention to their grievances as well as promote their
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ideological goals. The group, which has existed in various parts and forms since the late
1990s, started primarily as a religious study group, but later it metamorphosed into a
violent insurgent group in 2009 seeking to overthrow the Nigerian government and
replace it with a regime purely based on Islamic laws and ideology. Boko Haram’s
activities since 2009 marked an intensification in the frequency and violence of its
attacks. Following their satisfying the stipulated threshold, the U.S. Department of State
designated the group as a terrorist organization in 2013 following intelligence that
supports that it had developed links with other international militant groups to wage a
global jihad. The U.S. action was informed by the United States African Command.
General Rodriquez’s report corroborated “communications, training, and weapons link up
between Boko Haram, al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula in Yemen, al-Shabaab in
Somalia, and al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb” (Guitta & Simcox, 2014, p. 6).
Soon after, other countries such as Canada in 2013, Australia in 2014, and the
United Kingdom in 2014, and international organizations like the United Nations and the
European Union in 2014 designated Boko Haram as a terror group and proscribed its
activities. In June 2013, President Goodluck officially attempted to declare Boko Haram
a terrorist organization and proscribed it under Nigerian law, but he was stopped by the
pressure from the northern Nigerian oligarchy. The terrorist members and anyone caught
aiding and abetting them were intended to be prosecuted under the country’s Terrorism
Prevention Act, which was expected to facilitate the legal prosecution of the suspects.
Boko Haram has implemented two strategies: defensive and offensive. Their
offensive method is aimed at destroying, defeating, or neutralizing the Nigerian state
authority, while defensively they use avoidance, protection, and traps to sustain their
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forces and campaign. Boko Haram uses large numbers of assault rifles, rocket-propelled
grenades, shells, mortars, enhanced explosive devices (IED), and vehicle-borne
improvised explosive devices (VBIEDs) in their activities. The group holds an
unidentified number of tanks, armored personnel carriers, anti-aircraft capability, and of
recent used drones to drive their offensive and defensive operations (This
Day Newspaper, 2019; Vanguard Newspaper, 2018) stated that because of the group’s
frequency of attacks and threats in Nigeria, the country remains the third-most impacted
country by terrorism, a position that it has retained since 2014 when Nigeria was ranked
the second most terrorized country in the world by the GTI (2019). Boko Haram has
helped to create political environments where violence is prevalent and dominant, and the
military campaign has been unable to end the threat.
Rise of Violence: Incidents, Fatalities (Death), and Injuries
Since 2009, Boko Haram activities have resulted in about 20,000 to 30,000
fatalities and over 2.3 million population relocated from their homes. At its height
periods that are between 2010 and 2015 the group confiscated a large swath of territories
in northeastern Nigeria, including major cities such as Maiduguri, Mubi, and Gwoza,
formed a significant threat to the Nigerian state (Febab, 2008, p. 4). Febab further stated
that overall; an estimated 15 million people have been individually affected by the Boko
Haram insurgency and the military counterinsurgency efforts. Boko Haram fighters
continued to attack and kill civilians in towns and villages, abduct thousands of people,
forcibly marry off girls and women to their deadly fighters, and conduct mass-fatality
terrorist attacks against governments’ properties, markets, churches, mosque, and camps
for internally displaced persons.
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Table 2 presents an impact analysis of Boko Haram and the number of attacks,
fatalities, and injuries from 2013–2018.
Y-axes indicates the number of attacks; the X- axes indicates the periods.

Source: Global Terrorism Index reports.
Table 2 shows that the Boko Haram attacks started building up substantially in
2013 and that the total percentage of attack is 10.13%, while fatalities are 9.28% and
injuries are 5.69%. However, the nature and force of attacks changed substantially in
2014, and Nigeria was ranked the second-most ravaged country by terrorism in 2014
against its fourth position in 2013. Going by the records, Nigeria experienced the biggest
yearly decline in terrorism in 2014, which is characterized by the massive rise in the
number of attacks by 22.13%, fatalities of 38.17%, and injuries of 27.96%. There were
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5686 more people killed from terrorism in 2014 than in 2013, “an increase of almost
300%, which is largely due to the increasing ruthlessness of Boko Haram” (GTI, 2015).
No other restive or ethnic agitating group added to these killings or wastages that
rose to pandemic level in the hands of the internationally recognized terrorist group,
Boko Haram. No doubt, there were several restive groups in Nigeria, agitating for one
thing or the other, but none escalated violence to such a proportion as the Boko Haram
and Fulani herdsmen. Other major groups were OPC, NDA, and IPOB. These groups
came from various regions in Nigeria. They were all agitating for either the emancipation
of their people or for greater economic opportunities. While Boko Haram’s propaganda
launches an attack against the Western educational system, coupled with their ceaseless
attempt to Islamize the sovereign and secular country of Nigeria, the IPOB proselytize
self- determination as a panacea to the lopsided federal structure tilting in favor of the
North and responsible for economic and political marginalization of the Ibos (Okoli,
2018). The outcome was the proscription and designation of IPOB as a terrorist group by
Nigerian government and a continuous conspiracy of silence and defense of the Boko
Haram by a Northern dominated government as just criminals and not a terrorist group.
This is in defiance of the international community that designated the Boko Haram a
terrorist group based on available data. Unfortunately, Nigerian Government and its
security agencies have not lived up to their expected bidding in deterring these societal
challenges (Bolarinwa, 2017, p.10). Ojochenemi (2015) observed that:
In spite of the magnitude of the threat posed by other restive groups that have
sprung up in Nigeria, the Boko Haram remains the most enigmatic in terms of
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raison d’etre, the most violent in terms of modus operandi and the most
destructive. The group is unarguably second to none in terms of brutality,
savagery, wanton destruction, callousness and its scope of operation (p.1).
There was a slight fall in the Boko Haram attack incidents from 22.13% in 2014
to 19.65% in 2015, showing a decrease of 2.48%. The substantial reductions in attack
incidents and deaths corresponded with major military operations in partnership with the
Civilian Joint Task Forces (Civilian-JTF) that successfully targeted terrorist groups
(Omenma & Hendricks, 2018). Table 2 indicates that incidents, deaths, and injuries from
Boko Haram terror activities fell for the 3 consecutive years since its peak period of
2014, and the percentage of incidents, deaths, and injuries kept decreasing for 2 years
(2016 and 2017) running until an increase of 5.04% in terrorism incidents in 2018. In
2015, 8 years after the Boko Haram commencement, roughly half of the violence (49%)
attributed to Boko Haram involves civilian targets, 44% involves engagements with state
and external forces, and 2% involves conflicts with other non-state armed groups (Dowd
& Drury, 2017, p.4). GTI (2019) data show Nigeria as one of the 10 countries most
impacted by terrorism, ranked by the number of deaths primarily arising from Boko
Haram incidents. Recently, suicide attacks have accounted for an increasing number of
deaths (Campbell, 2018). This is to continuously terrorize local populations, undermine
confidence in the ability of the government to provide protection to the civilians, and
confront the terrorist groups in some of their dominated territory.
Nigeria has initiated different kinds of intervention policies to counter Boko
Haram. Before 2009 when Boko Haram surfaced, Nigerian laws regarding terrorism were
centered on Section 11 of the 1999 Nigerian constitution, which enjoins or empowers the
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Federal Assembly to make laws for public safety and order and laws to ensure their
maintenance and security. In 2011, the National Assembly promulgated the Terrorism
Prevention Act (TPA), which classified acts of terrorism and provides the basis for the
investigation, prosecution, and outlawing of suspects in terrorism cases. This law was
amended in 2013, and the amended law expanded the role of the Office of the National
Security Adviser (ONSA) as the main coordinator for all counterterrorism execution
activities. Since 2009, the primary interveners against the threats and attacks of Boko
Haram are the Nigerian security forces: the Nigerian Armed Forces, Nigeria Police Force
(NPF), the Department of State Security (DSS), Nigerian Customs Service (NCS),
Nigeria Immigration Service (NIS), the Nigeria Security and Civil Defense Corps
(NSCDC), and the Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA).
The military has been the dominant actor with the active involvement of the
Civilian-JTF in the implementation of operational capability and degrading security
environment. The military, through the command of Operation Lafiya Dole, has been
involved in a number of security actions. Ground forces have been a predominant feature
of the military counterterrorism, especially in south-central Borno, where Operation Deep
Punch I and II have seen several incursions into the Sambisa Forest area as well as the
use of airpower through a series of operations called Ruwan Wuta (Rain of Fire) have
also been an essential part of counterterrorism operations (Omar & Ndubuisi, 2018). The
military focuses on stability operations, which aim at restoring order and security, and
providing the platform for the return of peace and order in the northeast.
To achieve these aims, the military operational mechanisms involve roadblocks,
checkpoints, cordons, and searches, guarding of key points, armed military patrols, and
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military raid operations (Aminu, 2013). The regular offensives of Boko Haram through
suicide, explosive devices, wholesale assaults, and conscriptions have forced the military
to rely on the establishment of checkpoints along major roads and armed military patrol
operations in the northeast. Permanent checkpoints are placed at locations intended to
maximize the chances to identify, arrest, and intercept Boko Haram members who
possess explosives, seeking to reach large population centers or bombing targets. Also,
the military uses raid operations to destroy specific Boko Haram hideouts, rescue
conscripted persons, reclaim locations, and kill designated terrorist members. Omenma
and Hendricks (2018) noted that the combined military and Civilian-JTF effort increases
the efficacy of raid operations at Boko Haram hideouts, cells, camps, and networks, as
well as having devastating effects on the group, as more terrorist members were either
arrested, killed, or dispersed in the process.
In 2014, President Goodluck, in his efforts to end to the insurgency, turned to the
Specialized Tasks, Training, Equipment, and Protection (STTEP), a South African
private military contractor, which assisted to degrade the group and reclaim some
territories under Boko Haram before the 2015 general elections. By March 2015,
President Buhari terminated the STTEP contract, turned to the Multinational Joint Task
Force to fight the Boko Haram, contributed US $100 million, and strengthened
diplomatic cooperation with Nigeria’s neighbors for a more effective regional
counterterrorism approach (Assanvo et al., 2016). As of July 27, 2016, MNJTF
recaptured 80% of the territories under the Boko Haram. Civilian causalities dropped
from 2000 in 2015 to 573 in 2018. Within this period, MNJTF has significantly
weakened the capability of the terrorist group and continued to successfully dislodge it
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from its strongholds. Presently, the Nigerian military in combination with the civilian
defense forces and Multinational Joint Task Force (MNJTF) has pressed back the Boko
Haram to the Sambisa Forest and Lake Chad region, and their operations are restricted to
Borno, Yobe, and part of the Adamawa states bordering Borno and Nigerian neighboring
countries of Chad, Cameroon, and Niger.
Besides the military’s being the dominant actor that engages Boko Haram, both
domestic and regionally, the Nigerian government continues to employ non-military
strategies. The declaration of a state of emergency led to the formation of the Combined
Joint Task Force (CJTF), a localized network of informal, paramilitary vigilante forces
with loose ties to the Nigerian military. Since 2009, repeated efforts to open dialogues
with Boko Haram have been unsuccessful. In 2011, former President Olusegun Obasanjo
held discussions with key members of the Boko Haram without formal or tangible results.
In 2012, Colonel Sambo Dasuki engaged in shuttled diplomacy to persuade northern
community leaders to engage with Boko Haram members and emphasized government
willingness for negotiation and possible group-level amnesty. Before the successful
negotiation and release of 21 and 82 Chibok School girls in October 2016 and May 2017,
respectively, both the administrations of Goodluck and Buhari repeatedly sought to
negotiate a peace deal with the Boko Haram, publicly offering unspecified amnesty as an
incentive. There was also a ceasefire announced by a federal government spokesperson in
2014, but the Boko Haram members denied the existence of a ceasefire and its
participation in negotiations (Pate, 2014). The Jonathan administration invested
significant political capital in negotiations to exchange detained Boko Haram members
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for more than 200 schoolgirls kidnapped in 2014. The approach to the negotiations has
been ad hoc, reactive, frequently secretive, and highly controversial.
The development and adoption of the National Counter-Terrorism Strategy
(NACTEST) in 2014 and its review in 2016 paved the way for a multi-faceted approach
to preventing/countering violent extremism (P/CVE) and the development of a
comprehensive national approach to tackle violent extremism. Nonmilitary approaches
include a deradicalization program through the Office of the National Security Adviser
(ONSA), the Presidential Initiative for the North East (PINE) that seeks to alleviate the
economic motivation (poverty and illiteracy) behind terrorism, the National Emergency
Management Agency (NEMA) that focuses on the provision of humanitarian relief to
victims of violence, the military collaboration with the Presidential Committee on the
North East Initiative (PCNI), and the National Directorate for Employment (NDE) to
implement the Operation Safe Corridor program, which aims at deradicalization,
rehabilitation, resettlement, and reintegration of repentant, low-risk Boko Haram
combatants. The nonmilitary counterterrorism approaches continue to record a modicum
of achievements through the prevention of attacks, reintegration of repentant terrorists,
and rescuing civilian captives from terrorist members. For instance, the Operation Safe
Corridor program initiated since 2016 has facilitated the unconditional surrendering of
over 87 terrorist members to the Nigerian security forces in 2017 (The Guardian, 2017);
about 760 suspected Boko Haram members have been released to the Borno state
government for reintegration into the society (The Nation, 2017), while 468 suspects
discharged for lack of evidence by the court are under the auspices of ONSA for
deradicalization programs (New Telegraph, 2017), and some 1,800 women and children
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have returned to their communities after rehabilitation programs at the Gombe camp
facility (Febab, 2018). As of November 2018, the report shows that 101 clients have
graduated from the Gombe camp facility of Operation Safe Corridor since 2016, and 157
were still undergoing deradicalization. While the responses of the Nigerian government
have been varied with a greater focus on the use of hard-power, repressive measures
emphases of government on rehabilitation and deradicalization are beginning to be
highlighted because they have produced some tangible outcomes.
The success of this approach, both the kinetic and non-kinetic, is clear, and this
informed the declaration of Boko Haram as being technical defeated by the Muhammadu
Buhari administration. On the contrary, civilians consider the Boko Haram as part of their
daily life activities because the jihadist groups have successfully coerced them through
fear into a desired behavior pattern such as the “buying of peace” (Comolli, 2015).
Instead of the jihadist groups declining in operations, they have expanded to Cameroon,
Chad, and Niger and linked up with the al-Qaeda family in the Maghreb region. Despite
the official position of the Buhari’s administration, a large body of literature agrees that
counterterrorism suffers from three crucial weaknesses. First, the security sector
corruption and mismanagement have continued to undermine Nigeria’s response to the
Boko Haram and hence, the repeated incidents of Boko Haram activities. Transparency
International (TI) (2017) reported that corrupt military officials have siphoned money
through the creation of fake defense contracts, and the proceeds are often laundered in the
United Kingdom, United States, and elsewhere (The Guardian, 2017). The consequence
is a lack of access to modern and key war capabilities such as amphibious equipment,
counter-improvised explosive devices (C-IED) equipment, ground and airlift assets, and
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intelligence gathering platforms as well as low morale of the soldiers. Second, the slow
pace of the judicial system in charging and trying suspected militants and a lack of
sufficient training for prosecutors and judges to implement anti-terrorism laws is a
problem (Blanchard & Husted, 2019). This explains the absence of witnesses that stalled
the trial of some high-profile Boko Haram cases and the hasty discharge of 468 detainees
over the want of evidence by a special court panel. Third, the Operation Safe Corridor is
highly obscured with unclear criteria as to who constitutes low-risk and high-risk, and in
practice that leaves any potential defector unable to judge what category or fate he will be
assigned if he does indeed defect (Febab 2018, p. 9). To surrender is not enough,
especially in the case of the Boko Haram. Combatants may be forced to surrender by
several factors, such as military pressure, a lack of supplies, or war fatigue. There are
allegations of some ex-combatant who previously surrendered, and subsequently were
rehabilitated and released into societies returning to the Boko Haram sects because of
their inability to reintegrate properly.
Specific Findings
This special issue seeks to provide an analysis of the policies and measures
adopted to counter Boko Haram terrorism and insurgency. The experts brought together
to demonstrate the origin of Boko Haram, the obvious and not-so-obvious motivations,
the pull and push factors, policies of military interventions, and the non-military
deradicalization have been adopted, revealing emerging trends, lessons learned, and
overviews of the security status of the conflict environment of the northeast. Their
findings demonstrate a diverse approach to counterterrorism that attempts to match and
counter the unique local conditions which drive terrorism, while also seeking to provide
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insight and policy recommendations for countering insurgency. This study summarizes
the important findings of selected articles from three broad perspectives: the historical
and motivational aspect of the Boko Haram insurgency; the counterterrorism approaches
within the rubrics of military operations and civilian participation; and the non-military
security management in a complex global phenomenon and the push and pull factors that
mobilize people who are usually localized and may differ from country to country. The
special issue contains several important and rich data that advance our knowledge in the
understanding of the dynamic nature of insurgency in Nigeria and the Lake Chad region.
Table 3. Perpetrators Groups Responsible for More than 100 Terrorist Attacks, 2018
Terror Groups

Nos. of
Attacks

Total Killed in
2018

2017

2018

Taliban

1266

8508

40%

73%

Islamic State of Iraq and the
Levant (ISIL)

735

2221

-45%

-69%

Al-Shabaab

493

1149

-14%

-39%

FULANI EXTREMIST
New people’s Army (NPA)

304
283

1188
188

285%
-22%

245%
-6%

Maoists/Communist party of
India

268

189

-15%

-15%

Houthi extremists

267

659

68%

48%

BOKO HARAM
Islamic State-Khorasan
Province

243
155

1327
1203

-29%
-21%

-16%
-8%

Kurdish Workers’ Party

122

136

-23%

-28%

National Liberation Army of
Colombia

121

106

95%

126%

Separatists (Cameroon)

112

150

176%

1150%

Source: Global Terrorism Database
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Information on the perpetrator of the attack was reported for 64% of all attacks
worldwide in 2017. In 90 attacks, the individual perpetrator or perpetrators were
identified, but they were not known to be affiliated with a particular group or
organization. This represents a decline in the number of attacks carried out by unaffiliated
individuals, down from 102 in 2017. The lethality of attacks carried out by unaffiliated
individuals also decreased from more than 200 victims killed in 2016 to 85 in 2018. In
2018, 320 groups and organizations carried out terrorist attacks worldwide, fewer than
the 372 groups and organizations identified as perpetrators of terrorist attacks in 2017.
The perpetrator groups responsible for the most attacks in 2018 are shown in Table 3.
The Taliban in Afghanistan was responsible for more terrorist attacks in 2018
than any other group by a wide margin, and those attacks resulted in more deaths than
those of the next seven deadliest perpetrator groups combined. Between 2017 and 2018,
the number of terrorist attacks carried out by the Taliban increased by 40%, and the total
number of deaths increased by 73%. Aside from the Taliban, several of the perpetrator
groups that significantly increased their terrorist violence in 2018 were more loosely
organized or decentralized movements rather than formally structured organizations.
These included Fulani extremists active primarily in Nigeria, Houthi extremists in
Yemen, and Anglophone separatists in Cameroon. The number of attacks carried out by
Fulani extremists increased 285%, and the number of deaths increased 245%. Likewise,
the number of attacks carried out by the Houthis increased by 68%, and the number of
deaths increased by 48%. Perhaps most dramatically, violence carried out by Anglophone
separatists in Cameroon increased from a few attacks in 2017 to more than 100 attacks
and 150 people killed in 2018. The Islamic State and affiliated groups were among those
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whose terrorist violence decreased in 2018. These include Islamic State of Iraq and the
Levant (attacks decreased 45%, and deaths decreased 69 %.), as well as Boko Haram
(attacks decreased 29%, and deaths decreased 16 %.), and the Islamic State-Khorasan
Province (attacks decreased 21%, and deaths decreased 8 %.). However, these groups
remained very deadly, and their attacks resulted in thousands of casualties in locations
around the world. Attacks by the Islamic State operatives in Iraq and Syria killed more
than 1,500 victims in 2018. The group also claimed responsibility for deadly attacks in
Iran, the Philippines, and Tajikistan.
When considering perpetrator group patterns, it is important to note how groups
and organizations evolve, often breaking into factions and splinters, sharing members,
changing names and aliases, locations and personnel, and forming mergers, alliances, and
franchises. As a result, groups are a problematic unit of analysis that can lead to
shortsighted inferences. Combining perpetrator organizations, groups, and individuals
with shared goals into movements helps capture broader, long-term patterns of
perpetrator activity. For example, GTD researchers organized the perpetrators associated
with the Islamic State movement and Al Qaida movement for comparison.
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Table 4. The Twenty Most Fatal Terrorist Attacks In 2016
Date

Terrorist

Death

Description

1

Countr
y
SYRIA

10/12/2016

ISIL (1)

421

2

IRAQ

03/07/2016

ISIL (2)

283

3

IRAQ

07/02/2016

ISIL

300

4

IRAQ

10/21/2016

ISIL

284

5

08/19/2016

SPLM-10

283

6

S.
SUDA
N
IRAQ

Suicide bombers attacked Palmyra city
killing at least 421
Suicide bombers detonated an explosive
laden vehicle at shopping mall
Assailants executed 300 civilian
activists, security members in Mosul
Assailants abducted and killed 284
civilians in Mosul
283 people including civilians and
soldiers were killed

04/21/2016

ISIL

250

7

IRAQ

10/03/2016

ISIL

190

8

10/03/2016

TALIBAN

154

9

AFGH
ANIST
AN
IRAQ

10/29/2016

ISIL

130

10

IRAQ

01/29/2016

ISIL

112

11

IRAQ

09/12/206

ISIL

100

12

IRAQ

10/28/2016

ISIL

100

13

IRAQ

11/24/2016

ISIL

98

14

IRAQ

08/04/2016

ISIL

97

15

IRAQ

10/11/2016

TALIBAN

90

16

NIGE
RIA
FRAN
CE
AFGH
ANIST
AN
CAR

01/30/2016

88

09/95/2016

BOKO
HARAM
LONE
ACTOR
TALIBAN

11/23/2016

FPRC

85

07/23/2016

KHORASA
N

83

17
18

19
20

AFGH
ANIST
AN

07/14/2016

Source: Global Terrorism Database

87
85

Assailants executed 250 women in
Mosul for refusing to marry ISIL
al-ALiL assailants executed 250 former
members of police and army
Assailants attacked Kunduz city killing
154 people in the clash
Assailants kidnapped and executed 130
former police & army officers
Assailants attacked armed forces with
explosives killing 112 people
100 assailants and suicide bombers
killed in explosive laden vehicles
Assailants kidnapped and executed 100
former police officers
A suicide bomber detonated at vehicles
carrying pilgrims
Assailants abducted 3000 civilians, and
97 of them were executed
Assailants attacked security forces,
killing 90 soldiers in Chah Anjeer
Assailants raided Dalori village killing
88 people
Assailants rammed a truck into a crowd
& opened fire killing 87 people
At least80 assailants and five security
personnel were killed
At least 85 civilians were killed in an
assault near Bria hospital
Suicide bombers killed and maimed 83
people and injuring at least 230
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Table 4 indicates the 20 most fatal terrorist attacks in the world in 2016. The table
was a clear indication of terrorist and the mayhem perpetrated by the terrorist in the year
2016. The Boko Haram terrorist activities were very prevalent. In 2016 alone the Boko
Haram apart from other levels of dastardly act of terrorism recorded fatal attacks in
Nigeria and other places. In 2016 in the city of Karamga in Niger Republic, the Boko
Haram attacked a military base and residential areas and killed at least 46 soldiers, 28
civilians, and 156 assailants. Table 3 also shows that in January 2016, Boko Haram
terrorist attacked Dalori village in Nigeria; they opened fire on residents in Dalori killing
88 villagers in one attack. Many of the villagers were drowned in the nearby river. The
table also showed the killing of 144 people in the city of Fotokol in Cameroon.
According to the table, the Global Terrorist Index noted that Boko Haram destroyed
another 107 people in a little unknown town in Nigeria in the same year. In January 2016
in Kukuwa in Nigeria, the Boko Haram attacked and killed 97 residents in mosques and
in their homes.
To further narrow the table down, the study showed the number of times each
group caused a fatal attack in 2015. Boko Haram was only second to ISIL. Table 3 shows
that ISIL attacked its targets six times, while Boko Haram attacked its targets five times
fatally in 2015. These attacks excluded other levels of attacks where people were killed,
injured, or completely displaced.
The curious part of this study is that the IPOB was not represented in the table.
The reason could either be that either the group is not a terrorist group in the real standard
of the designation process or that there is a conspiracy that is hidden underneath the
process that made the group a terrorist organization only in the eye of the government of
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Nigeria. According to Amnesty International (2015), 150 peaceful pro-Biafra (IPOB)
protesters were killed by the security forces in Nigeria. This is one of the suppressive
tendencies of the government of Nigeria against the peaceful and non-violent agitation of
the IPOB group. The irony of the decision of the government of Nigeria to proscribe and
designate IPOB as a terrorist group and not the Boko Haram and the Fulani herdsmen can
only be summarized in this context; the “killers” (Boko Hara and Fulani herdsmen) are
innocent while the “killed” (IPOB) are terrorists.
The African Commission on Human and People’s Rights (2018), stated, “The
declaration of the IPOB as a terrorist group and the attacks by Federal Government
agencies on its members constitute a prima facie violation of the African Charter.” The
commission further stated that IPOB is a nonviolent group that operates in the open
following the law as well as being universally respected in several nations of the world
where it is registered as a lawful organization. Amnesty International (2016, p. 1) stated:
Opening fire on peaceful IPOB supporters and bystanders who clearly posed no threat to
anyone is an outrageous use of unnecessary and excessive force and resulted in multiple
deaths and injuries. Amnesty International further stated that all IPOB gatherings
documented by Amnesty International were mostly peaceful. In those circumstances
where there were pockets of violence, it was mostly in reaction to shootings by the
security forces.

CHAPTER 5
DISCUSSION, POLICY IMPLEMENTATION, INITIATIVES,
LIMITATIONS AND CONCLUSION
This chapter discusses the results and findings of the Global Terrorism Index
regarding the political and criminological conspiracy of terrorism in Nigeria. This
investigator discovered that studying terrorism in Nigeria now is essential because of the
country’s current political and social quagmire. This chapter discusses the limitations of
the study, followed by policy implementations, policy initiatives, and recommendations
for further research. This chapter presents answers to the following research questions:
1. What is the prevalence of terrorism in Nigeria?
2. What impact does terrorism have on political, economic, educational, and
social institutions in Nigeria?
3. What is the designation process of terrorism?
4. How can researchers successfully address the problem of terrorism and related
conspiracy in Nigeria?
Terrorism has a negative impact on the political, educational, economic, and
social institution of Nigeria in almost every aspect, and generates different patterns of
criminal behavior in different parts of the country. Aluko (2014) found that such a
negative impact on the economic realm has depleted the nation’s wealth and increased
the cost of goods and services.
Studies over the last decade have established that terrorism or internal conflicts
can have substantial negative economic consequences in a conflict-ridden country
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(Collier, 2002) and in neighboring countries (Murdoch & Sandler, 2002; 2004). A civil
war is a broader conflict than terrorism because the former usually involves a minimum
of 1,000 deaths and may result in tens of thousands of casualties, while a terrorist
incident results, on average, in a single death (Sandler, 2003). Thus, a country may be
plagued with at least one terrorist incident yearly for 10 years, but experience relatively
few deaths and modest property damages.
Terrorism is a tactic that may be associated with a civil war, insurrection, or other
form of political violence. As such, terrorism typically involves little loss of life and
property. Naturally, there are exceptions, such as the March 11, 2004 Madrid train
bombings or the December 21, 1988 downing of Pan Am flight 107, where 200 and 300
people perished, respectively. But even in these cases, the loss of life, though tragic, is
small compared with most internal conflicts. Thus, the likely macroeconomic impact of
terrorist events is not anticipated to rival that of civil wars. This prediction may change
under a few scenarios such as a large-scale attack like 9/11, a protracted terrorist
campaign with many deadly incidents, or some devastating attack on a developing
country’s export sector (recall the Yemen shipping example). One should not expect that
a modest number of terrorist incidents in most countries will greatly affect the countries’
income. Sector-specific microeconomic influences are often the most likely consequences
from terrorism.
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Cost Distinction
There are numerous cost distinctions that could be drawn regarding terrorism
losses. Direct costs, for example, involve the immediate losses associated with a terrorist
attack or campaign and include damaged goods, the value of lives lost, the costs
associated with injuries (including lost wages), destroyed structures, damaged
infrastructure, and reduced short-term commerce. In contrast, indirect or secondary costs
concern attack-related subsequent losses such as raised insurance premiums, increased
security costs, greater compensation to those at high-risk locations, and costs tied to
attack-induced long-run changes in commerce. Indirect costs may surface as a reduced
growth in GDP, lost FDI, changes in inflation, or increased unemployment. A judgment
must be made as to how to distinguish between direct and indirect costs, though any
distinction may strike researchers as arbitrary.
Fortunately, this distinction is not necessary to characterize the economic impact
of terrorism, which can be represented in terms of some well-defined macroeconomic
(e.g., real per capita GDP growth) or microeconomic variable (e.g., reduced tourist
receipts). These variables then represent the consequences of terrorism in terms of
aggregate or sectoral activity. If lost output, casualties, and damaged infrastructure are
sufficiently large, they will affect the economy’s productive capacity with
macroeconomic or microeconomic repercussions. The identification of these impacts is
of greater importance than the mere tally of losses if policy is to ameliorate the economic
ramifications of terrorism. Thus, we concentrate on relating terrorism to macroeconomic
and microeconomic variables that policy can be designed to bolster. Terrorism comes in
two essential types: domestic and transnational. Domestic terrorism is homegrown with
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most consequences for the host country, its institutions, citizens, property, and policies.
In a domestic terrorist incident, the victim and perpetrators are from the host country.
The implication of terrorism for contemporary society has been one of the most
discussed since September 11, 2001. The notion that terror attacks impact the labor
market is not obvious in part because there are many channels through which terrorism
may affect employment (Joint Economic Committee, 2002). On the one hand, the rapid
recovery from wars and natural disasters has led many authors such as the British
political economist Mill (1848) to argue that nations recover quickly when the direct
impacts on productive capital are modest. Becker and Murphy (2001) argued that
uncertainty about future terror attacks increases the difficulty of understanding the
consequences of terror attacks. They concluded that, ultimately, history shows that
economics adjusts rapidly. On the other hand, time series and cross-country studies have
found that terrorism has heterogeneous impacts on employment and growth (Enders,
Hoover, & Sandler 2016; Gaibulloev, Sandler, & Sul 2014). Abadie and Gardeazabel
(2003) investigated the economic effects of repeated terror attacks in the Basque Country
(an autonomous community in northern Spain) and find that after the outbreak of
terrorism, GDP per capital declined by 10 percentage points relative to the control region.
Research Question 1: What is the prevalence of terrorism in Nigeria?
From my assessment of the literature on violence in Chapter 2, regional agitation
has occurred in almost all regions of the country. In the Western region, the OPC holds
sway. The group is agitating for the country’s restructuring and a full representation of
the people of the region in the country’s power equation.
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The NDA and MEND are the well-known regional agitators for the emancipation
of their land and environment that suffered ecological degradation over the years. The
mono-economic power of the country is potential derivable from this region, and yet the
region has no reflection of such economic advantage. The inhabitants are bedeviled with
bad roads, polluted water, and degraded farmlands.
The IPOB is in eastern Nigeria and is believed to be marginalized in the national
scheme. The region fought and lost a war that claimed over 1 million young men and
women from 1967–1970. The aftermath of the war is still believed to be hanging as an
unwritten judgment upon the people of the region. The region has only produced one
president for less than 2 years in the 60-year existence of the country. The lack of a
federal structural presence has led the group to believe that they do not have a place in
Nigeria. This is the cause of their nonviolent agitation. The group has stirred the ire of the
Nigerian government, which led to their controversial proscription and designation as a
terrorist organization.
In northern Nigeria, the deadly Fulani herdsmen and the internationally
recognized terrorist group Boko Haram hold sway. According to the Global Conflict
Tracker (2020). Boko Haram has killed over 37,500 people from 2011–2019, displaced
2.5 million people in the Lake Chad Basin, and created nearly 244,000 refuges. The
group is against Western civilization and ideology. Boko Haram uses mass bombing and
suicide bombing to pursue their vendetta against the country. The group was designated a
terrorist group by the U.S. Department of State in 2013.
Another deadly group from the Northern part of Nigeria is the Fulani herdsmen.
The group, along with Boko Haram, has killed over 3,000 people from 2013–2016 (The
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Punch, 2016). The group is responsible for the killing and kidnapping of many Nigerians
in every region of the country.
Research Question 2: What impact does terrorism have on the political,
economic, educational, and social institution in Nigeria?
To answer this question, it would be useful to define terrorism again to gain
insight into its impacts. Schmid (2004) stated that the phenomenon of terrorism has been
widely interrogated in the literature, and it has been an unfortunate part of our
civilization. Omede and Omede (2015) described terrorism as a strategy and a tactic, a
crime, a holy responsibility, a justified reaction aimed at oppression, and an inexcusable
abomination. It is the use of violent action aimed at achieving political goals to force a
government to act (Hornby, 2000).
The history of modern-day terrorism in Nigeria is traceable to the emergence of a
group of Islamic militants named Boko Haram (Vanguard, 2014). Schmid (2004) defined
terrorism as a violent act intended to create fear for political achievement or religious or
ideological goals. Calling something an act of terrorism means the action must have a
political, religious, economic, or social goal. In most cases, the actions do not serve the
pure profit of the perpetrators. The actions of the perpetrators are directed mainly at a
deeper change in politics, religion, and society.
According to Tolu and Abe (2011), “National development accounts for the
overall development or a collective socio-economic, political as well as religious
advancement of a country or nation.” The activities of Boko Haram, Fulani herdsmen,
and other restive groups in Nigeria have created economic setbacks. In the environment
of seeming anomy, no substantial advancement in many spheres of life can be achieved.
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Meaningful educational activities and other forms of learning cannot endure in a
terrorized environment. In such environments, people live in constant fear and pain from
the loss of loved ones.
Research Question 3: What is the designation process of terrorism?
This research question became necessary given the number of restive groups in
Nigeria and around the world. The determination of whether the activities of such have
risen to that of terrorism has become imperative. In Nigeria, there are groups like Boko
Haram, whose activities have claimed thousands of lives and damages to properties and
caused many to become refugees. The Fulani herdsmen group has also caused the
destructions of thousands of people’s lives. They have also maimed and destroyed many
farmers and their farmlands in Nigeria. There are other groups like the IPOB, OPC, and
MEND. These groups are mainly set out for regional emancipation and agitation for
better economic welfare of their regions.
Among these groups, only the IPOB, with no record of violence or killing, was
designated a terrorist organization by the Nigerian government. No data support any act
of violence or killing or destruction of any human life by IPOB. Rather, Amnesty
International (2017) revealed that at least 150 people pro-Biafra protesters were killed by
the security forces in 1 year. Adangor (2018, p.148) observed that the;
The proscription of the Indigenous People of Biafra (IPOB) as a terrorist
organization by the federal government following the ex parte order granted by the
federal High Court Abuja remains one of the most politically divisive actions taken
by the current Buhari government.
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Adangor further stated that politically motivated designation has blurred the fine lines
between separatism and terrorism. Pursuant to the provisions of the Terrorism Prevention
Act of 2011, as amended, Adangor (2018) argued that the IPOB is a separatist group
committed to the emancipation of the IBO people of the southeast Nigeria. To proscribe
the IPOB or treat it as a terrorist group is to politicize terrorism and weaken the efficacy
of the war on terrorism and the Terrorism Prevention Act.
Research Question 4: How can researchers successfully address the problem
of terrorism and related conspiracy in Nigeria??
Nigeria, the most populous country in sub-Saharan Africa as well as the biggest
economy, is facing a crisis in its nation-building process. Virtually every part of Nigeria
claims it’s marginalized (Anderson 1983). Associated groups have been calling for the
convocation of a sovereign national conference, a meeting to discuss whether Nigerians
want to continue to stay together as one country. Something unpleasant has happened to
the effort to create “true Nigerians” (i.e., Nigerians who honor their Nigerian identity
over the other identities they bear in the country). Thus, some people believe that Nigeria
is a “mere geographical expression,” a nation only in name and with only very few true
Nigerians. (World Bank, 1997) observed that “successive governments in Nigeria, like in
many African states, lack the political will to initiate or sustain policy or structural
transformation, or to embark on sound economic reform to reposition the state for
greatness.”
The battle in nation building combines with poverty, inequality, and a lack of
development in the country, creating an existential crisis for many Nigerians. For many
like the IPOB, a way of resolving this sense of alienation is to retreat from “Project
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Nigeria.” The idea is to fashion a nation out of the different nationalities that make up the
country and put together meanings in chosen primordial characteristics, often with the
Nigerian state as the enemy. Adibe (2012) called this process the “de-Nigerianization
process.” In Nigeria, there is a heavy burden of institutionalized memories of hurt,
injustice, distrust, and even a veiled longing for revenge by various individuals, ethnic
groups, regions, and religious groups. In this sense, actions that ordinary Nigerians
rightly see as heinous are seen by some as normal, and even heroic.
There is a feeling that this “de-Nigerinized inclination” is accelerating by leaps
and bounds. No individual or political authority enjoys purely apparent legitimacy across
the main liability lines, so the country is in awful need of creating more “true Nigerians.”
If this trend continues, there is a high probability of a growing number of
individuals and groups ruining or even attacking the Nigerian state. Already, some of
those entrusted with the nation’s common patrimony steal it blind. Some law
enforcement officers turn the other way if offered a little incentive; organized labor,
including university lecturers occasionally goes on prolonged strikes on an impulse;
students may resort to cultism and exam malpractices; and workers often drag their feet,
refuse to put in their best, and moonlight. It seems that everyone has one form of
complaint or another against the Nigerian state and its institutions.
A long-term solution for containing Boko Haram’s and Fulani herdsmen
terrorism, and for deactivating them along with other insurgency groups in Nigeria, is to
resolve the crisis in the country’s nation-building processes. Terrorism will end when
Nigerians come to see themselves as one people and build that genuine sense of what
Anderson (1983) called “imagined communities.” For Anderson, a nation is a community
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socially fashioned and imagined by the people who identify themselves as part of the
group. Anderson said a nation “is imagined because the members of even the tiniest
nation will never know most of their fellow-members, get to know them, or even hear of
them, yet in the minds of each lives the image of their communality” (Anderson, 1983).
Restarting the mired nation-building process is not going to happen overnight.
The past ad hoc national conference convened by the federal government to recommend
solutions to the country’s many challenges has not succeeded because of deeply
entrenched distrust among Nigerians. However, the conference, if well managed, could
be a credible stage for all stakeholders to vent their grievances and frustrations with
“Project Nigeria.” The catharsis will be useful as the country seeks long-term solutions to
its nation-building problems. In the same vein, some proposals from the conference, if
implemented, could help placate some aggrieved groups.
One long-term solution to the Boko Harm challenge could come by default. The
growing wave of national optimism could help blunt the pull of the centrifugal forces.
This is a surge of new hope around the country’s economic prospects, typified in the
recent inclusion of Nigeria in the Mexico, Indonesia, Nigeria, and Turkey (MINT)
emerging economies and the rebasing of its GDP, making it the leading economy in
Africa and the 26th largest in the world. Because people instinctively want to identify
with success, economic growth, especially if it is associated with more equitable
distribution and people-oriented development, could pacify irredentist pressures, as
separatist forces may have to contend with the fear of leaving at the time the country is
being seen as among the likely future economic superpowers of the world.
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As Nigeria’s economy develops, the various parts of the country could develop
organic economic connections that will help further the cause of the nation-building
process. For instance, if the groundnuts produced in the north are used in the manufacture
of peanut butter in the southeast, and the cocoa produced in the west is used for
manufacturing chocolate drinks in the north, such economic linkages will help blunt
interregional animosities and thus further the cause of national unity and cohesion.
Limitations
One of the major limitations of this study is that the issues surrounding terrorism
are complex and difficult to study empirically because there is no definitive definition of
what terrorism is. It may be a particular fight for freedom when viewed from another
perspective. The literature on this subject regarding the severity, concepts, determinants,
and implications on the conspiracy of terrorism is scant. The major reason for perceived
lack of interest in this area of study is that data are not readily available, especially when
they are needed to discuss the extent of conspiracy of terrorism and the method of
designation.
The second limitation is the inability to get all the most recent data needed from
the Nigerian terrorism index database because of official bottlenecks. Another obvious
limitation of this study is the ability to generalize its findings to other nations or
geographical regions. In addition, there have been several concerns about case study
research, and in particular the case evaluation which Guba and Lincoln (1981) referred to
as “unusual problems of ethics. An unethical case writer could so select from among
available data that virtually anything he wished could be illustrated” (p. 378). Both the
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readers of case studies and the authors themselves need to be aware of biases that can
affect the final product.
Further limitations involve the issues of reliability, validity, and generalizability.
Hamel (1993, p. 23) observes, “the case study has basically been faulted for its lack of
representativeness and its lack of rigor in the collection, construction, and analysis of the
empirical materials that give rise to this study. This lack of rigor is linked to the problem
of bias, introduced by the subjectivity of the researcher and others involved in the case.
However, all these arguments against case study research misses the point of doing this
type of research.
Policy Implementation
Since the country’s return to civil rule on May 29, 1999, the Nigerian government
has taken various actions to address the problems of regional restiveness and acts of
terrorism. These actions include the enactment of 2013, a huge allocation of resources to
purchase weapons that could match the fireworks of the terrorists, and other forms of
counterterrorism. Despite considerable expenditure by the Nigerian government over the
past decade, counter-terrorism actions by security forces have achieved limited success,
and the country is still rated on the Global Terrorism Index (2012) as one of the states
most affected by terrorism. Is the problem one of bad policy, strategy, and tactics, or is
corruption in the leadership ranks of the security forces also to blame?
It is projected that terror groups have killed over 30,000 people in Nigeria since
2003 and caused the displacement of more than 2.4 million. These groups include Boko
Haram, operating in the Lake Chad Basin region, Islamic State West Africa Province
(ISWAP), and Ansaru, also called al-Qaeda in the Lands beyond the Sahel.
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In December 2019, ISWAP beheaded 11 Christian hostages to avenge the killing of
Islamic State leader Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi by U.S. forces. In January 2020, the group
killed the chairman of the Adamawa state chapter of the Christian Association of Nigeria,
Lawan Andimi. Boko Haram also kidnapped three university lecturers in Yola in eastern
Nigeria and carried out several organized attacks in Borno state.
The Nigerian government allocated over N6.7 trillion to the security sector
between 2010 and 2017 to bolster its capacity for counter-terrorism strategies. This
amount doesn’t include extra budgetary allocations such as the US$1 billion the
government borrowed in 2013 to finance counter-terrorism operations and the US$21
million approved for the Multinational Joint Task Force (MNJTF) in 2015.
Despite increased money for the security sector, counter-terrorism operations by the
Nigerian military in cooperation with joint agencies such as the MNJTF of the Lake Chad
Basin Commission have achieved only partial success. The military did for a time
succeeded in pushing terrorist groups out of major cities, as was seen when the regularity
of attacks in metropolitan centers dropped between late 2015 and early 2018. However,
terror groups found operational bases in the large civilian populations in rural and remote
areas from which they launched a flood of attacks on poorly secured villages, military
units, and critical state infrastructure. After undergoing a technical defeat by the military
in three local government areas in Borno State, a renaissance by extremists has given
them control of these regions.
Nigeria’s counter-terrorism operations are failing basically because of strategic
and tactical ambiguity due to poor intelligence and rivalry among security agencies
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involved in the operations. Evidence suggests that corruption in counter-terrorism
operations in Nigeria may also be a major factor.
Conflict entrepreneurs within the chain of command of military leadership and the
ministries, departments, and agencies in the security sector apparently use military funds
meant for counter-terrorism operations to enrich themselves. Military spending is usually
not audited due to its delicate nature. The secrecy that surrounds it encourages
embezzlement. Unless conflict entrepreneurs are stopped, terrorism will continue in
Nigeria and the Lake Chad Basin.
In 2017, forty-three million U.S dollars million cash earmarked for covert
operations by the National Intelligence Agency was missing and later uncovered in a
private building in Lagos. In 2018, investigations were opened into one billion U.S
dollarsUS$1 billion that went missing after being approved to the Nigerian Army for arms
procurement from the Excess Crude Account. Conflict entrepreneurs in the security
sector also purportedly operate through the award of fictitious procurement contracts and
illegal extra-military activities such as coercion and collusion with militants in
illegal fishing in the Lake Chad area.
These activities undermine effective security force action by weakening the
military’s capabilities. For instance, because they do not procure by approval and
sometimes procurements are not even made, the military may be lacking in weapons and
logistics, making it difficult to effectively combat terrorism. Corruption has undermined
effective security force action by hollowing out the military’s capabilities
Despite huge financial allocations for arms procurement and logistics supplies,
military sources blame the death of 83 soldiers in a 2016 Boko Haram ambush and a
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similar 2018 attack on the 157 Task Force Battalion in Metele, Borno State, on
equipment shortfalls, poor weapons and logistics supplies, and low morale among
combatant officers, who sometimes are not paid. Over 118 soldiers including the
battalion commander died in the attack.
This failure of counter-terrorism operations may account for the resurgence of terror
attacks in Nigeria’s northeast, especially Borno State. And notwithstanding significant
financial allotments for these efforts, the terror threat in Nigeria remains considerable.
Questions need to be asked about whether counter-terrorism funding is being used
wisely, and whether the tasks themselves are effective. Unless Nigeria’s government
stops the activities of conflict entrepreneurs and profiteers, violent extremism will
probably remain a major security threat in Nigeria and across the Lake Chad Basin
region. To do this, the state needs to strengthen legal and institutional structures for
dealing with corrupt practices in the security area, especially in counter-terrorism
operations. It also needs to investigate and prosecute those who have exploited their
positions to personally benefit in the counter-terrorism campaign to enrich them. Most
fundamentally, a strategic change in the leadership of the military may be crucial,
alongside a rethink of the excessive militarization of counter-terrorism operations in the
northeast zone of Nigeria.
Policy Initiatives
The increasing complexity of terrorist attacks across the globe is a harsh reality of
the challenges the world is facing today in addressing the menace of terrorism. The
inherent difficulties in combating terrorism calls for more cooperation and assistance
among governments in reducing the threat presented by terrorism. The Boko Haram
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insurrection in Nigeria has hurt virtually every component of human endeavor, including
the economy, the polity, and the lives and livelihoods of people across the northeastern
Nigeria and beyond. The insurgency has been met with resolve and strength of the
Multinational Joint Task Force, and as a result we have continued to witness the
emergence of rescued survivors and victims’ previously under the brutal oppression of
Boko Haram. Communities have pulled together to provide succor to those affected.
However, it is imperative to recognize that the war against Boko Haram and
violent extremism in general is not over yet. There is therefore an urgent need to sustain
the impetus in preventing and countering not only the insurgency of Boko Haram, but all
other manifestations of violent extremism in Nigeria. To confront violent extremist
activities and groups, including addressing its root causes, the government of Nigeria
must launch a comprehensive policy agenda and national action plan to provide direction
and harmony to the government’s efforts toward that end. Furthermore, Nigerian
government signed the presidential directive to the Policy Framework and National
Action Plan for Preventing and Countering Violent Extremism in 2017. As were the
previous laws passed and signed by the president, the problem is not the law but
enforcement of the law. This law provides a clear policy environment that interconnects
peace, security and development and will strengthen our efforts at mainstreaming peace
in an effort at strengthening achieving development initiatives at the grassroots.
The Policy Framework and National Action Plan rest on the following major
objectives.
•

Equitable distribution of national resources to all regions in the country
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•

Engaging the youths through laudable programs like scholarship to indigent
students and creating employment to graduates

•

Enforcing the existing laws on crime and terrorism

•

Addressing the issue of marginalization and Niger Delta

•

Proscribing and designation of Boko Haram and Fulani herdsmen as terrorist
organization

•

Bolstering institutions and coordination in preventing and countering violent
extremism

•

Strengthening the rule of law, access to justice, and human rights

•

Integrating Strategic Communication in Preventing and Countering Violent
extremism

The policy initiative outline in this study implements a complete government and
a complete society approach. It encourages the active involvement of departments and
agencies of government, ministries, and critical stakeholders from different sectors of the
civil society such as religious leaders, regional youths, teachers, men and women, law
enforcement, the media and community-based organization to build controlled networks
of peace that create safe and resilient communities across Nigeria, in which human rights
and the rule of law guide the approach to battling violent extremism.
Local governments should to develop local action plans to mirror a national action
plan to implement locally significant programs in preventing violent extremism. The
study includes evidence to support the inclusion of youth in peace security and
development by crafting an enabling space for their creative energies to thrive. In this
framework, student organizations are encouraged to establish workshops and seminars to
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discuss the reasons of violent extremism, develop ideas on how best to counter violent
extremism. Recently, Nigeria passed into law the “Not Too Young to Run” Bill intended
to remove age restrictions on aspiring young persons. Youth involvement and upward
mobility will reduce susceptibility to violent extremism.
Equitable distribution of the proverbial “national cake” is germane for national
cohesion. If all sections of the country feel included and political appointments are spread
across the regions of the country, the push for restiveness would be well minimized and
discouraged.
The youths in any country are the bedrock of the labor force of the country, and
not engaging them meaningfully means that they will automatically engage themselves in
any available opportunity, regardless of the effect on the society. Such youths would feel
that society is against them. Therefore, joining groups that would provide for them what
the society cannot offer would appear very attractive to them.
Moreover, enforcing existing laws would help to deter crimes and terrorism. The
difference between Nigeria and other developed societies like the United States is not that
Nigeria is lacking in relevant laws; the difference is that while the United States makes
laws and enforce them, Nigeria makes the same laws and enforce team only against the
perceived enemies of the government in power. The proscription of IPOB, and the
systemic but Machiavellian approach adopted by the soldiers and government in handling
the Boko Haram and deadly Fulani herdsmen give serious credence to abuse of
constituted laws of terrorism.
The issue of marginalization and the Niger Delta environmental issue should be
appropriately addressed. The Ibos from eastern Nigeria have felt marginalized after the
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war that ended in 1970. The same war that was declared “no victor, no vanquish” appears
to not have ended for the people of the region. This is the same region that formed the
IPOB for the main reason of leaving the geographical area called Nigeria. The Ibos feel
that they can never be powerful Nigeria. They feel that the proverbial national cake has
been served up in a way to slight their region. They feel that federal appointment and
presence have been denied the region for years. The group is quick to mention that
Nigeria as an independent nation has existed for 60 years. In that period the Ibos have
ruled for 194 days by General Aguyi-Ironsi and another 2 years and 319 days by Dr.
Azikiwe, while the north has ruled for over 35 years, the west has ruled for over 11 years,
and the south for over 6 years. This lopsided method of administration in a country where
Ibos are fellow stakeholders could only aggravate the quest for emancipation and selfdetermination. The NDA have not been spared in this political and economic deprivation.
The area has been depleted by oil spillage, which has drastically impacted the agricultural
and aquatic life of the people of the region. Despite the massive wealth through crude oil
from the area, the people of the region are still living in abject poverty and neglect. Little
wonder there has been a sporadic record of restiveness in the region.
Despite lips service paid by the government and its agencies, like the ministry of
Niger Delta, Nigerian lives are not visibly better. The money meant for cushioning the
effects of the violence may not eventually get to the desired people. The laudable projects
for the community may be well covered on the pages of newspapers but exist only in the
imagination of those entrusted with the resources of the people. The youths mainly
involved in restiveness feel that they have no hope in a society ruled by old men whose
actions do not consider their digital perspectives on life. The government should
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therefore create positions for such youths to represent the interest of the emerging
generation. After all, the future belongs to the youth.
Conclusion
The purpose of this research was to conduct a literature review of conspiracy
theory and associate the theory to the decision-making processes. The conspiracy theory
of terrorism may not offer the best theory for explaining terrorism, but it has contributed
to the operational principles and actions of many decision-makers and supporters from
various perspectives.
This study examined the political and criminal conspiracy of terrorism and its
impacts on Nigeria’s economic, social, and political institutions. The study also explored
how terrorism has impoverished the masses and generated various patterns of criminal
behavior. It scrutinized how terrorism has led to the recent economic recession, multiple
kidnappings, and state of normlessness in the polity. It concluded that the longtime reign
of terrorism and ethnic restive jingoism have negatively resulted in social and moral fear
and economic, educational, social, and political institutional decay. This criminal
behavior has also led to the depreciation of the country’s cultural values that the founding
fathers bemoaned. The obvious negative impact of terrorism and its conspiracy, as shown
in the decision-making process of the Nigerian government, has led to ethnic division and
mutual mistrust among the populace.
The decision of the government to designate a nonviolent group like IPOB as a
terrorist organization, while refraining from similarly proscribing a group like Boko
Haram and Fulani herdsmen, created a clear room for the conclusion of conspiracy and
further exploration of this study. The mistrust caused by the conspiracy has led to
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sectional fear and further agitation for ethnic division and self-determination.
Internationally recognized terror groups like Boko Haram and the Fulani herdsmen have
continued the vicious circle of killings, kidnapping, and maiming of innocent citizens;
these have also led to poverty and economic deprivation.
After thorough review of the existing literature, the study also described the
conspiracy of international intervention, and the designation of certain groups like Boko
Haram as terrorist organizations in the fight against terrorism. Though many factors are
involved in the proscription and designation process, the study found that lack of
international involvement in the fight and lack of publicity by Western media have led to
the audacious activities and menace of Boko Haram and Fulani herdsmen.
In light of these findings, the study suggests that Nigeria needs to take serious and
decisive steps to mitigate the regional restiveness and terrorism. This means that the
Terrorism Prevention Act of 2011, which was meant to address the issues of prevention,
prohibition, combat, and financing of terrorism should be stringently enforced to serve as
a deterrent. The government should follow the steps of the international community in
proscribing and designating the Fulani herdsmen and Boko Haram as terror groups. The
government should also be truthful about the intelligence report on these groups. The
several reports of the killing of the leaders of these groups and possible decimation of the
entire group by the government have been unfortunately inconsistent with reality.
Future studies should analyze and compare the incidences of conspiracy of
terrorism, the causes, and damages in various countries in Africa. Such study would help
to mitigate the endemic challenge, and to promote peaceful coexistence among every
ethnic nationality.
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